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A nation that is boyc otted is a nation that is in sight of surrender . Apply this 
economic, pea cefid, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force . 
It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressur e 
upon the nation which, in my judgement, no modern nation could resist. 
President Woodrow Wilson, 1919 
INTRODUCTION 
International economic sanctions are not singularly modem phenomena . In 
ancient Greece, Pericles of Athens enacted the Megerian Decree in 432 BC in response to 
hostile acts taken against it by neighboring Megera . Later, during the American 
Revolutionary War, Thomas Jefferson encouraged the use of sanctions as an effective 
tool of coercive foreign policy to be used against the colonists' enemies . Since then , 
following the historical precedence of economic acts like the Megerian Decree , economic 
sanctions have continued to be used as tools of coercive diplomatic policy. For example, 
following World War I, President Woodrow Wilson encouraged the use of economic 
sanctions as an equally strong, but less costly alternative to the use of military force . 
However, even though economic sanctions have long been used in attempts to force 
desired responses out of target nations (especially unilateral sanctions), they have seldom 
achieved their stated foreign policy goals . 
As previously mentioned, the use of economic coercion (sanctions) is not new. 
Throughout history , sieges, blockades, and embargoes have often been used in 
conjunction with military force . " Sanctions have regularly supplemented the use of 
force in war and have also been used overtly and covertly to influence the foreign and 
domestic policies of target states, " in the place of military aggression . (Doxey, 1980, pp. 
3). But it is only since increased economic interdependence in the global market that 
economic sanctions have become a foreign policy tool to be used alone, separated from 
any link or threat of the use of military force. With this in mind, sanctions have become a 
preferable foreign policy tool to the use of force since they do not involve a risk to the 
lives of the citizens of the country imposing the sanctions. Therefore, economic 
sanctions could be seen as being less violent and less risky, while simultaneously being 
more "democratic" (based on international norms). (Wallensteen, 1983: 87). 
Following the encouragement of people like President Woodrow Wilson, the use 
of economic sanctions by both the League of Nations and the United Nations against 
member states increased dramatically. These multinational organizations thought that, 
with the imposition of sanctions, aggressive nations would be either deterred from using 
or forced to stop the use of military force . Therefore, the use of economic sanctions as a 
tool of those trying to secure a global collective security increased dramatically following 
World War I. However, after sanctions failed to work against Italy between 1935 and 
1936, faith in them as a tool of collective security began to significantly wane . 
(Wallensteen , I 983: 88). 
Then, following World War II, economic sanctions became known as a way of 
expressing opposition to and displeasure with the domestic policies and practices of 
target nations, even if the offending practices did not threaten the collective security. In 
fact, since the end of the war, sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia in 1966 
(Renwick, 1981: 74), Greece, Portugal and Spain because other members of the 
international community did not approve of the policies and practices of their respective 
regimes . In addition, sanctions have even been imposed against other target nations 
because of their ideologies (e.g . sanctions imposed against Cuba for being Communist). 
(Wallensteen, 1983: 89). However, then as now, the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
as a coercive diplomatic tool of foreign policy has been revealed as limited. 
Many contemporary experts agree that American economic sanctions do not 
work. For, according to sanction scholars like James Blessing, "it can be argued that the 
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suspension of aid does not appear to have been a very effective means of inducing change 
in recipient behavior. This conclusion is in general agreement with the conclusions of 
numerous other studies which show that neither the granting of aid nor the use of 
economic sanctions have been effective mechanisms of inducing behavior change," in 
target countries . (Blessing , 1981: 533 ; Bienen and Gilpin , 1980: 89; and Taubenfeld , 
1964: 188). 
American economic sanctions allow Fidel Castro to blame the US for his own 
failures and some might suggest that the ineffective sanctions be either modified or 
dropped entirely. This course of action has been suggested to American officials in order 
to remove from Castro the opportunity to blame the US for his own economic and 
political errors in judgement. Even Castro's own daughter , Alina Fernandez Revuelta, 
recently commented along these same lines to USA Today that, "it's impossible not to lift 
the embargo . He (Castro) , himself doesn't want it lifted since it is his only pretext for the 
poverty and misery in Cuba. " (Deane, 1998: 17 A) . 
In fact, 22 US Senators sent a letter to President Clinton in November of 1998 
stating that the time and place has come to look into ending the American embargo of 
Cuba . "Our policy toward Cuba has not changed in nearly forty years," the letter said , 
"but the world we live in has changed a lot. It is, therefore, time for a serious , systematic 
look at our policy," regarding the use of economic sanctions against Cuba. (Deane , 1998: 
17A). 
Economic sanctions appear to be worthy of further study mostly because of their 
prevalent use within the contemporary international arena of coercive diplomacy. Other 
tools of coercive diplomacy, while effective, are less frequently applied and often call for 
the overt application of military force. Military force that is applied either as a show of 
aggression towards the target nation's leadership or as a sign of displeasure with the 
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target nation's internal policy choices. Consequently , because of the prevalent 
application of economic sanctions as a coercive tool of foreign policy , this paper will 
look to explore the use of unilateral economic sanctions as they have been applied to 
Fidel Castro's Cuba by the United States. For, even though Cuba had all of the 
conditions and characteristics that should have made it extremely susceptible to the 
influence of economic sanctions on its domestic policy choices , it has been able to 
withstand the test of more that four decades of economic sanctions. 
The Hypothesis 
The primary problem addressed by this paper is that economic sanctions generally 
fail. And one of the reasons that they fail is the central issue of this study . Consequently , 
the hypothesis of this paper is that as the period of time that unilateral economic 
sanctions are imposed increases, the target nation's opportunities to overcome key 
vulnerabilities increases and, as a result, the effectiveness of the unilateral economic 
sanctions imposed decreases . As its main focus , this study will look at the economic 
sanctions imposed by the United States against Cuba and their effectiveness at achieving 
their stated American foreign policy goals . This 'effectiveness ' can be evaluated by 
seeing whether or not the economic harm incurred, "has translated through the target 
state's political system and into either policy or regime changes ." (Losman. 1979: 41). 
International economic sanctions , have often been defined as "a ban on the 
movement of goods and hard currency to and from a foreign country ." (LatinFinance). 
However, for the purposes of this research project, it is necessary to narrow down the 
previous , general definition to include 'unilateral economic sanctions' . Therefore, we 
will define unilateral economic sanctions as economic restrictions or measures used by 
one country or state against another to both uphold standards of behavior expected by that 
country's customs or laws and to attain a specific foreign policy goal. 
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The purpose of this paper 
Authors like Kaempfer and Lowenberg have already done extensive research 
regarding the public choice theory-based justifications for the use of economic sanctions , 
and any attempt made by this study to add to their work will be feeble at best. Therefore, 
the purpose of this paper is to follow more closely to the trail of case studies blazed by 
sanction scholars like Margaret Doxey, Donald Losman and Donna Kaplowitz that 
attempt to explain why economic sanctions are ineffective. Both Doxey and Losman 
look at the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in general while Kaplowitz tries to 
cover the Cuban case study in its entirety. In addition, this paper will attempt to answer 
whether or not economic sanctions become less effective as time increases . This is 
important because having a generally established time period would allow policy makers 
to try economic sanctions for a time and then move on to use other foreign policy tools if 
the sanctions fail to attain their stated foreign policy goals. 
Then, following the introduction and the statement of purpose , the author will 
explore the definitions regarding the roles and functions of economic sanctions as tools of 
coercive diplomacy as they have been presented by authors like Wallensteen , Doxey, 
Kaplowitz and Losman . By looking at the various definitions of sanctions we will add to 
our general knowledge about the effectiveness of economic sanctions as coercive foreign 
policy tools. Next, we will look at a general introduction to the problems associated with 
the application of economic sanctions followed by the hypothesis or major proposition of 
this paper. This, in tum, will be followed by a presentation of the methodology or testing 
strategy by which the author intends to test the hypothesis of this paper. 
After presenting the previously described framework, upon which the rest of this 
paper will be built, the author will look into the history and background of economic 
sanctions. This section will provide the reader with a brief historical background of 
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sanctions, from the time of the Megarian Decree in ancient Greece to the time of the 
American Sanctions imposed against Cuba. 
Then, following a brief historical description of the evolution of American 
economic sanctions in general, we will look into the reasons why democratic nations like 
the US have been inclined to impose them against target nations, from the time of 
Thomas Jefferson to the time of Bill Clinton. This general treatment of the history of 
American economic sanctions will be followed by an in depth look into the evolution and 
specifics of the American economic sanctions applied against Cuba. This section will 
cover the history of US sanctions against Cuba from their embryonic stage of 
development during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower through their 
metamorphoses during the Kennedy, Carter, Reagan and Clinton regimes and up to the 
present day. This is important since the American experience with economic sanctions 
against Cuba will be used as the real-world test case for the hypothesis of this paper. 
Following the historical background of economic sanctions in general and US 
economic sanctions against Cuba in particular, this paper will next analyze how the US 
economic sanctions imposed against Cuba have affected the Cuban economy. This is 
relatively important to understand since authors like Losman have suggested that the 
political purposes of economic sanctions (their foreign policy goals) can not be attained 
without the sanctions first negatively impacting the economy of the target regime. 
(Losman, 1979: 41 ). Therefore, by finding out how much the US economic sanctions 
imposed against Cuba negatively affected the Cuban economy, we should be able to see 
that the economic damage was insufficient to translate into the desired regime changes, 
political policy alterations or an ideological reorientation. And finally, after looking at 
the economic impact of the US sanctions against Cuba, we will summarize the key points 
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of this paper as well as state the conclusions that the author has drawn from the evidence 
presented herein. 
The Problem 
The main problem with economic sanctions as tools of foreign policy is that we 
have had to ask ourselves repeatedly why they seldom work. In other words, economic 
sanctions are often ineffective at meeting their stated foreign policy goals. Whether they 
are ineffective because they have been unilaterally applied or because the target nation is 
eventually able to circumvent the negative impacts caused by economic sanctions may be 
part of the explanation. Still, the matter of primary importance is whether or not 
economic sanctions have been able to attain their stated foreign policy objectives. 
Then, the second problem that must be addressed regarding the use of economic 
sanctions as tools of foreign policy is why sanctions fail to achieve their stated goals. Of 
course, in a limited number of cases (between 13 and 15 percent), economic sanctions 
have succeeded in attaining their foreign policy goals. However, as the length of time 
that the sanctions are imposed increases , the less effective the sanctions become. 
(Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 6). In other words, the longer that the imposing country waits for 
sanctions to work, the less likely that they will succeed at attaining their stated foreign 
policy goals at all. 
Granted, in some cases like South Africa and Columbia, sanctions have been able 
to achieve some of their stated foreign policy goals some of the time. However, 
especially following World War II, most economic sanctions have failed. In many cases, 
they have been unable to do what they were supposed to do or cause what they were 
supposed to cause a majority of the time . According to Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott 
and Kimberly Elliott, "extensive research on the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
throughout this century suggests that," (Elliott, 1997: l) unilateral sanctions - even when 
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imposed by the largest economic power in the world - are unlikely to succeed when 
applied in today's increasingly interdependent global economy. For, as Elliott continues, 
"since 1970, unilateral US sanctions have achieved some of their foreign policy goals in 
only 13 percent of the cases where they have been imposed." (Elliott , 1997: l) . 
Thirteen percent of economic sanctions imposed during the past two decades, 
then, have only partially succeeded at attaining some of their stated foreign policy goals. 
An unacceptable rate of failure if it were applied to the use of military force. And yet, the 
American political leadership seems perfectly satisfied with the current pace being set by 
its ineffective economic sanctions . 
However, it is not the passage of time alone that undermines the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions. There are other factors that contribute to the failure of economic 
sanctions. Episodes between close allies are generally short, to the point , and often 
successful. Conversely, if the target nation shares its animosity for the imposing country 
with a foreign power, the target country is more likely to overcome the negative affects of 
economic sanctions by receiving economic assistance from that foreign power -
especially if the sanctions last for an extended period of time. And finally, the greater the 
inherent likelihood of success of economic sanctions against a certain target country, the 
shorter the time needed to achieve results. In other words, if the economic sanctions 
applied against a target nation are going to work at all, they should be able to attain their 
stated foreign policy goals within a relatively short period of time. Otherwise , if the 
sanctions are allowed to drag on for an extended time period, and even if the foreign 
policy goals are met , chances are that the success of the sanctions episode will be 
attributable to external influences other than the economic sanctions. 
In any event, the inverse relationship between the effectiveness and the duration 
of the economic sanctions argues against a strategy of slowly applying more and more 
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pressure over time until the target country caves in. Time affords the target country the 
opportunity to find alternative suppliers, to build new economic relationships with other 
nations, and to mobilize domestic popular opinion in support of its policies. (Hufbauer, et 
al, 1990: 6). Consequently, sanctions that are imposed quickly and harshly have an 
increased chance of succeeding. 
As previously mentioned, sanctions that are long and drawn out over an extended 
period of time, allow the target country to overcome the "key vulnerabilities" that made it 
an attractive target for the application of economic sanctions in the first place . "The 
average cost imposed by sanctions against the target nation as a percentage of GNP in 
success cases was 2.4 % and 1 % in failures. Also, while successful economic sanctions 
lasted an average of 2.9 years, the duration of ineffective sanctions considered to be 
failures was eight years or longer." (Hufbauer, et al: 1). Therefore, based on the 
preceding information, it should be easy to see that it is better to apply sanctions hard and 
fast rather than let sanctions drag on for years. And yet, with the case of Cuba, the US 
has decided that sanctions might work if we just give them another year to force Fidel 
Castro to change his domestic politics and offending policies. 
Methodology 
If the hypothesis of this paper holds true in the Cuban case, one would expect to 
see a negative relationship between the increase in the period of time that unilateral 
economic sanctions are imposed and the ability of the target country (Cuba) to overcome 
key vulnerabilities. Additionally, one would also expect to see that the increased ability 
of the target nation to overcome key vulnerabilities results in the decreased effectiveness 
of the sanctions at attaining their stated goals. 
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Time / Ability to overcome vulnerabilities 
Hypothetical trend in decreased effectiveness of unilateral 
economic sanctions when both time and ability to overcome 
key vulnerabilities are simultaneously increased. 
In order to find out if a negative relationship exists between the two independent 
variables and the dependent variable of my hypothesis, I plan to use the non-experimental 
method of a case study research design. Case study research allows students to look 
closely at events and learn about the multitude of factors that may be involved in 
explaining the (in)effectiveness of sanctions. 
Further, after looking at alternative explanations for the ineffectiveness of 
unilateral economic sanctions, the author realizes that the hypothesis of this study does 
not take into account some other variables that might also influence the effectiveness of 
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the sanctions. For example, it does not account for the "cult of personality" or powerful 
personal influences that some dictators, as leaders of target nations, have over their 
people. Also, this study does not account for the additional variable of the predominant 
religions of these countries. Some of the countries currently under unilateral economic 
sanctions have general religious beliefs and/or cultural attributes that make it less likely 
for the common people to put any pressure on their govemment(s) to comply with the 
demands of the country imposing the sanctions against them. And yet, after considering 
all of these other possible variables, the author has chosen the independent variables that 
he did in order to keep the hypothesis of this paper both simple and generally applicable. 
Units of Analysis 
Even though unilateral economic sanctions can be and sometimes are imposed by 
nations against corporations, for the purposes of this study, we will look only at unilateral 
economic sanctions imposed by the United States against Cuba in order to attain 
specifically stated policy goals. Initially, Cuba was chosen as the focus of this case 
study since it has had unilateral economic sanctions imposed against it by the US for 
almost 40 years. After having to face nearly four decades of unilateral economic 
sanctions imposed against it by the US, Cuba has had sufficient time to overcome the 
key vulnerabilities. In addition, the duration of the sanctions also allows us to judge the 
success of the American economic sanctions at attaining their stated goals. Therefore, by 
looking at the Cuban case, we should be able to examine intensely the hypothesis of this 
paper, try to define the relationship between the variables and demonstrate whether or not 




First, in the legal profession, "negative sanctions are measures of enforcement 
which follow violations of law . They are penalties which indicate the limits of 
permissible conducts and encourage compliance with known rules." (Doxey , 1996: 7). In 
an ideal world, negative sanctions would be a sufficient deterrent to countries or regimes 
that are thinking about violating international laws or norms. However, some nations 
disregard the threat posed by potential negative sanctions and consequently are subjected 
to the punishments that sanctions impose. And yet, even though there is no inherent 
problem with the concept of economic sanctions imposed within a nation (fines , 
penalties, etc.) where legislators can pass sanctions into law , the international arena is 
quite different. (Doxey , 1996: 7). 
In the international arena, the main actors are not individu al citizens or 
companies . Rather , they are "sover eign states, subject to no overarching authority , and 
there are few international institutions comparable to those found in states ." (Doxey, 
1996: 8). Therefore , in the international arena, the definition of sanctions given above is 
inapplicable. Moreover, even if a broader definition of sanctions which includes the 
defense of international norms as well as international laws issued , there is still a problem 
with the fact that nation-states that do not, "exhibit social cohesion to any marked 
degree." (Doxey, 1996: 8). As a result , it is not surprising that international sanctions are 
no longer given legal definitions or that many different definitions of sanctions are used 
today. 
In response to this problem, David Baldwin developed three common definitions 
for the term 'economic sanctions' . First, he defined economic sanctions as, "a rather 
narrow concept referring to the use of economic measures to enforce international law". 
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Second, "sanctions refer to the types of values . .. intended to be reduced or augmented in 
the target state ." Third, "the term sanctions corresponds to the concept of economic 
techniques of statecraft ," (Baldwin, 1985: 35-36) upon which this paper is based. 
Baldwin contrasts the definitions in terms of their scope. Economic sanctions are either 
measures used to enforce international law, which he considers to be, "narrowly legalistic 
and therefore unsuitable for general foreign policy analysis," or they are governmental 
economic tools used to gain influence over the target nation. (Baldwin, 1985: 36). 
However, the third definition of sanctions offered by Baldwin is too broad since it allows 
any politically motivated act of coercive economic foreign policy to be called a sanction . 
Yet, it is nevertheless both possible and desirable to, "preserve the sense of 
sanctions as penalties linked to real ( or even alleged) misconduct." (Doxey, 1996: 9) . 
From this perspective, violations of international laws (or even international norms) and 
the use of internationally backed enforcement tools are possible, but not essential to the 
use of economic sanctions in the international arena. (Doxey , 1996: 9). However, what is 
important is to separate sanctions from violent (the use of force) or even non-violent 
( diplomacy) foreign policy tools that are used , "specifically to further the interests of one 
or more states at the expense of others. Therefore, international sanctions can be properly 
defined as penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target 
nation's failure to observe international standards of conduct or to meet international 
obligations ." (Doxey, 1996: 9). 
As previously mentioned, for the purposes of this paper, it has been necessary to 
narrow down the previous general definition of economic sanctions to include 'unilateral 
economic sanctions'. Consequently, unilateral economic sanctions will be defined in this 
paper as: economic restrictions or measures imposed by one country or state against 
another to both uphold standards of behavior expected by the imposing country's customs 
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or laws and/or to attain a specific foreign policy goal or set of goals. Goals such as 
forcing a change in the leadership of the target nation's regime, policy reorientation, or an 
ideological alteration. 
These 'unilateral sanctions', "can either be acts of self help directly related to an 
injury sustained by the government imposing them (reprisal sanctions), or penalties for 
violations of internationally accepted rules or standards of conduct." (Doxey, 1996: 10). 
In this sense, by claiming violation of internationally accepted norn1s or laws, unilateral 
economic sanctions carry more credibility and encourage other nations to adopt the 
sanctions on their own against the target country. 
Furthermore, in addition to the issue of added international credibility, 
governments try to base their unilateral economic sanctions on moral grounds or 
internationally accepted norms to justify their sanctions domestically. Imposing nations, 
"will say that they are imposing sanctions to defend legitimate , worthy and general 
interests rather than to advance particular interests of their own. " (Doxey, 1996: 10). 
However, before believing the claims of the imposing nation, we must investigate the 
circumstances associated with each and every case . For, unless rules and norms have 
indeed been violated, the justification or authority claimed by the imposing nation for its 
application of unilateral economic sanctions can not be validated . 
Time 
The period of time necessary for a target nation to get "over the hump" or initial 
shock period of the most negative effects of economic sanctions varies from target to 
target based upon the number and degree of vulnerabilities it has to overcome. For 
example, the period of time necessary for Rhodesia to overcome its key vulnerabilities, 
was five years. Meanwhile, for Cuba, the time period needed to overcome the negative 
effects of the US imposed sanctions has been estimated to have been anywhere from one 
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year to almost a decade . Yet, even though Rhodesia and Cuba took different periods of 
time to overcome the negative effects of the economic sanctions imposed against them, it 
is important that we try to set a period of time sufficient enough for a target to overcome 
its key vulnerabilities. By overcoming its key vulnerabilities, the target nation is also 
able to overcome the negative effects of the economic sanctions imposed against it -
thereby rendering the sanctions ineffective. 
According to Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, "the most effective sanctions are 
imposed quickly and decisively to maximize impact ('successful' sanctions lasted an 
average of 2.9 years while failures lasted an average of 8 years)." (Hufbauer, et al, I 990: 
I). Therefore, for the purposes of our study here, this paper will set the period of time at 
eight years (following the time frame used by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott) so that we 
will have a concrete, empirically observable time frame with which we will work. This is 
important because , if we failed to establish a set period of time by which sanctions should 
work (and after which they become increasingly ineffective), we could draw whatever 
conclusions we wanted to from the case being studied at any given time . One paper 
might wait forever until the economic sanctions imposed against a target country attained 
their goal(s) and claim that they were successful, while another would wait only a brief 
period of time and then claim that the sanctions were i_neffective. Thereby incorrectly 
proving their hypotheses to be correct. 
Following this line of thinking, if a sanction effectively attains its foreign policy 
goals before a period of eight years has expired, then our hypothesis would have us 
believe that the target had been unable to overcome its key vulnerabilities . However, if 
after eight years passes and the sanctions still have not attained their goal(s), this study 
proposes that the sanctions are unlikely to ever attain their goals without some additional 
"shock" such as the use of military force to affect the desired change(s). 
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Key Vulnerabilities 
The 'key vulnerabilities looked at in this paper include: first and foremost a lack 
of diversity in trading partners; second, little diversification in domestic production; and 
third , a weak or poorly developed economy. First, a lack of diversity in trading partners 
will be defined by identifying the number and variety of trading partners that both supply 
a majority of the goods imported into the country and buy a majority of the target's 
exported goods. Second, the diversification of domestic production will be defined by 
the level of domestic agricultural and industrial output as well as by evaluating whether 
or not domestic production levels dropped or increased following the application of 
economic sanctions. And finally, the level of economic performance of the target 
nation's economy will be defined and evaluated by looking at the annual growth rate of 
the GMP (similar to the GNP and used by socialist economist in the 1960s to measure 
economic growth rates - excludes certain transportation sectors from the calculation of 
economic progression) as well as the GNP . For , according to sanction scholars like 
Perez-Lopez and Zimbalist, both the GMP and the GNP can be used to effectively 
measure the health of a target nation's economy. 
Ability to overcome 
By looking at the level of economic development, diversification of both domestic 
production and number of trading partners of the target nation (Cuba) of this case study, 
we should be able to determine to what extent Cuba has been able to overcome the 
negative repercussions of the American economic sanctions imposed against it. 
Therefore, this paper will look at Cuba, both before the unilateral economic sanctions 
were imposed, and after the predetermined eight-year period has ended, to see how well 
Cuba has been able to raise its level of economic development (as indicated by the annual 
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rate of growth of its GNP), diversify its domestic production and increase the number of 
its trading partners. 
Then, if we find that Cuba has been able to overcome the previously listed key 
vulnerabilities, we must subsequently accept that the unilateral economic sanctions failed 
to prevent the Cuban economy from growing. And if the sanctions failed to prevent the 
economy from growing, we should be able to see that they also failed to impose sufficient 
economic harm to force Cuba into acquiescing to America's demands. In other words, if 
Cuba has been able to overcome its key vulnerabilities after eight years of sanctions, and 
the economic harm imposed by the sanctions is insufficient to force Cuba to change its 
policies, then the US sanctions have not been able to attain their stated foreign policy 
goals and must be categorized as failures. 
Negative impact 
Next, the 'negative impact' of economic sanctions means in this case that the 
sanctions have damaged the target's economy so much that - for one reason or another -
the target nation is forced to act. Whether it acts by changing its policies in accordance 
with the sanctions' goals or by diversifying its domestic production - and its trading 
partners - such forced changes in behavior amount to both unwanted and increased 
(negative) costs. 
Ineffectiveness 
Following the application of economic sanctions against a target nation, the target 
nation is subjected to the sanction's negative effects. And, if the sanctions are effective, 
they will force the target nation to modify its political behavior in response to the 
negative effects of the sanctions. However, economic sanctions still can not be seen as 
effective unless the target nation's political response to the negative effects of the 
economic sanctions is the response sought after by the nation applying the sanctions. 
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Therefore, a sanction can be seen as effective only of it achieves its stated political or 
foreign policy goals. And yet, if the country imposing the sanctions continues to apply 
them against the target nation over an extended period of time, it is essentially stating by 
its actions that it does not believe that the sanctions have achieved their stated foreign 
policy goals. Otherwise, if the sanctions had successfully attained their stated foreign 
policy goals, there would be no reason to maintain the sanctions for even one additional 
day. 
Examples given in the paper earlier included the use of unilateral economic 
sanctions to stop human rights violations, antiterrorism , nuclear non-proliferation, anti-
narcotics, to induce political instability, and workers rights. But, without being quite so 
specific, I will state here that economic sanctions are effective only if they attain their 
stated foreign policy goals of forcing a change in the target nation's domestic policies, 
regime , or leadership, or ideology. 
Therefore, given the definition of a successful sanction. I will posit here that an 
ineffective episode of economic sanctions will be defined as any sanction that does not 
meet the requirements to be an effective sanction. In other words, if the economic 
sanctions imposed against a target nation fail to achieve their stated objectives, and the 
imposing nation continues to apply the sanctions, the sanctions must be recognized as 
being ineffective - a failure. Moreover, as the dependent variable of my hypothesis, it is 
essential to the success of this paper that I am able to illustrate the negative or positive 
effects that the two independent variables (time and the ability to overcome the 'key 
vulnerabilities) have on the level of effectiveness of the US economic sanctions imposed 
against Cuba. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF SANCTIONS 
History tells us that economic sanctions are not singularly modem phenomena . 
Throughout history, from the ancient Greeks to the present time, economic sanctions 
have been used by some of the most powerful nations, as coercive foreign policy tools in 
both their economic relations and their political conduct with other nations . In ancient 
Greece, for example, the domineering Pericles of Athens enacted the Megerian Decree of 
432 BC in response to hostile acts taken against Athens by Megera, a neighboring city-
state . The trade boycott prevented Megerian ships from accessing Athenian ports and 
excluded Megerian merchants from the markets of Athens. "The subsequent refusal of 
Athens to lift the boycott of Megera (a Spartan ally), in response to pressure from Sparta , 
was popularly believed to have caused the Peloponnesian War." (Baldwin, 1985: 150). 
Thus , the Megerian Decree became one of the first historically documented cases 
of the use of economic sanctions as a coercive foreign policy tool. As such , it is 
important to note for a couple of reasons . "First , it is a valuable reminder that economic 
sanctions are not a twentieth-century phenomenon .... And second, the case is sometimes 
used to buttress the contention that economic sanctions are costly and ineffective 
techniques of statecraft." (Baldwin, 1985: 150). 
Since that time , following the historical precedence of economic sanctions like the 
Megarian Decree, economic sanctions have continued to be used as tools of coercive 
diplomacy. First, they have been used to protect economic and commercial interests 
when faced with international competitors. And, second, they have been used in attempts 
to put pressure on target nations . Pressure used either to influence the domestic political 
policy choices of the target nations or to destabilize dictators or regimes that are believed 
to be 'hostile' or 'unfriendly' (Alerassool, 1993: 1 ). 
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The historical record further demonstrates that, by themselves , economic 
sanctions have seldom been able to, "roll back military aggression, have had a limited 
capacity to impair their targeted regime's daily operations, or force that regime into 
changing its domestic policies, and have never toppled a dictator." (Lopez, 1997: 70). 
Moreover, since the effectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions depends on many 
variables over which the sanctioning country has little control (like religion, external 
financial support by some foreign power, and the 'cu lt of personality' of the dictator in 
power), it is not surprising that these sanctions often inflict only minor and/or temporary 
damage on the target nation. 
Next, being unable to either inflict sufficient damage on the target's economy, or 
to obtain sufficient control over the target's policy making process, the foreign policy 
goals of the country imposing the economic sanctions can not be achieved - and the 
sanctions fail. Thus, as Kaempfer comments, "it wou ld be nothing short of an amazing 
coincidence if the effects of unilateral economic sanctions also happened to be damaging 
to the target nation." (Kaempfer, 1992: 163). 
Then, with the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in mind, this paper not only 
agrees with Kaempfer, but also proposes further that the desired outcomes of economic 
sanctions - their foreign policy goals - are rarely attained. For, according to Losman, 
"economic harm must be translated through the target state's political system into policy 
or regime changes. But, to the degree that dictators like Castro prevail, or charismatic 
leaders engender popular support in spite of ( or often with the aid of sanctions), the 
desired political changes rarely if ever occur." (Losman, 1979: 41 ). 
In sum, research on the effectiveness of economic sanctions since the time of the 
Megerian Decree suggests that economic sanctions are unlikely to successfully attain 
their stated foreign policy goals. In addition, a review of (unilateral) economic sanctions 
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since the 1900' s suggests that unilateral sanctions - even when imposed by one of the 
most dominant economic powers in the world - face difficult challenges, especially in an 
increasingly integrated international economy. Even against such small and vulnerable 
targets as Panama, Haiti, and Cuba, military force was eventually used (unsuccessfully in 
the case of Cuba) in an attempt to achieve American foreign policy goals - goals that 
seemed so unattainable to American policy makers when sanctions were used alone 
against the targeted regimes. 
American economic sanctions 
Since 1960, US sanctions have achieved foreign policy goals in only 13% of the 
cases where they have been imposed. (Elliott, 1997: 2). And yet, this cycle of failure 
remains incapable of deterring American policy makers from their continued reliance on 
economic sanctions as their main coercive foreign policy tool. In addition to whatever 
effect repeated failure may have on the credibility of the American leadership, other 
recent research suggests that economic sanctions are costing the US between $15 and $19 
billion dollars in potential exports lost. This, in tum, translates into 200,000 or more jobs 
lost in the relatively highly paid sector of employees working in export related jobs. 
(Hufbauer, et al, 1997: 2). As such, this persistent reliance on economic sanctions, in 
spite of available evidence indicating their ineffectiveness, can only have a negative 
effect on the credibility of the American political leadership. 
One example of sanctions research, by the Institute for International Economics 
regarding the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, was recently presented 
by research fellow Kimberly Ann Elliott before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means. In her statement, Ms Elliott empirically addresses the 
'conventional wisdom' of economic sanctions. Such 'conventional wisdom', as 
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explained by Ms. Elliott, suggests, "that sanctions never work, that they are costly 
politically and economically, and that their use should be constrained". (Elliott, 1997: 2). 
With the goal of constraining the use of economic sanctions in mind, the 
Institute's study empirically assessed the outcomes of 115 cases of economic sanctions, 
beginning during World War I and ending in the 1990s. Of the 115 cases studied, the 
US was a participant ( either as part of a group or independently) in 78 of the cases. 
Consequently, since America was involved in such a large portion of the cases, the results 
of the study as a whole can be broadly applied to the US. For example, the results of 
Elliott's study, indicate that the 69% failure rate of US economic sanctions was 
comparatively close to the 65% failure rate of the group studied as a whole. (Elliott, 
1997: 2). Consequently, with the results of the study showing that sanctions fail more 
than two-thirds of the time, American policy makers should be willing to try out other 
foreign policy tools besides sanctions. 
Yet, even after noting the 69% failure rate, the most important result of the 
Institute 's study is the fact that the effectiveness of American backed sanctions declines 
drastically when they are unilaterally imposed by the US alone. "Prior to the 1970s," for 
example, "sanctions in which the US was involved alone ... succeeded at least partially just 
over 50% of the time."(Elliott, 1997: 2). Then, between 1970 and 1990, the effectiveness 
of US sanctions fell to nearly 21 %. This shows a post-1970 increase in the rate of failure 
for American backed sanctions to almost 79%. A 'batting average' that is entirely too 
poor for any corporate executive, but apparently still perfectly suitable for the US 
political leadership. 
The US seems to use sanctions whenever it is faced with a foreign policy problem. 
A little more than two years ago, President Bill Clinton lamented the fact that 
America had become, "sanctions happy." And yet, Clinton is the president who has 
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signed laws for new economic sanctions against the target nations of India, Pakistan, 
Cuba, Iran and Libya and has used his executive powers to add to the rich legacy of 
sanctions inherited from past occupants of the White House. A pattern of behavior far 
different from what we would expect from someone "lamenting" America's over-reliance 
on economic sanctions. 
Maintaining its "sanctions happy" posture, the US has employed economic 
sanctions more often than any other country in the world. Early after World War I, the 
American infatuation with economic sanctions began when President Woodrow Wilson 
tried to sell the idea of the League of Nations to his countrymen, together with its newly 
crafted foreign policy tool of economic sanctions. Wilson famously declared in 1919 
that, "a nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, 
peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible 
remedy," for terrible problems. (Padover, 1942: I 08). Still, Americans did not buy into 
the concept of the League of Nations (the Senate refused to ratify US membership in that 
precursor to the United Nations). But, as time passed, American policy makers adopted 
Wilson's idea of sanctions as their top choice for a foreign policy tool. 
For example, since the end of World War I, the United States imposed economic 
sanctions more than 110 times (32 cases more than were covered in the Institute for 
International Economics' study). Such sanctions, as an often-used tool of American 
coercive diplomacy, as well as the denial of a target nation of customary export items, 
have included the severance of import or other financial relations with a target country. 
Both are examples of severe courses of action, taken in an effort to force the target nation 
to change its social, political or economic policies. 
In one instance, the US voted to block World Bank or International Monetary 
Fund loans in an effort to stop the spread of nuclear proliferation around the globe ( e.g. 
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India and Pakistan) . In other instances, the US restricted trade with a country to try and 
force it to change its human rights or political policies (i.e. Argentina, Chile , China and 
Cuba) . And occasionally, in the most severe cases of disobedience to the desires of the 
American political leadership, the US has been known to impose sanctions in an attempt 
to force the ouster of a foreign dictator or regime (Iraq and Serbia). 
Whatever the motivating factor, the current list of US sanctions covers 26 target 
countries, accounting for more than half of the world's population. And recently, since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the American Congress has felt freer 
to interfere in US foreign policy issues by instructing the president on the smallest details 
regarding both the imposition and waiving of sanctions . In short, whenever tensions rise, 
and the US becomes dissatisfied with the social , political or economic policies of another 
country, sanctions are often used as America ' s 'first strike' weapon of choice . (Hufbauer, 
1998: C0l). 
TABLES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES 
Countries in Which Countries on State- Countries on Drug Likely Targets of 
US Economic Sponsored Terrorism De-Certification List Future Sanctions(3) 
Sanctions are in full List - US Restriction (2) 
force - total embargo on Financial 
(1) Transactions 
Cuba Cuba Afghanistan China (4) 
Iran Iran Burma (Myanmar) Burma (5) 
Iraq Iraq Columbia (Myanmar) 
Libya Libya Iran Nigeria 
North Korea North Korea Nigeria Indonesia 








Source: Personal communications with personnel at the US State Department (Non-attributable) 
- Legislation passed by Congress in 1996 places additional restrictions on foreign companies 
that invest in the energy sector in Iran and Libya ( oil) or the use of appropriated property in Cuba 
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confiscated from American corporations and citizens. 
- Countries that are decertified because of poor counter-narcotics enforcement lose eligibility 
for US foreign aid. The US government is obliged to vote "no" on loan applications from these 
countries that are filed with multilateral development banks (The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund). National interest waivers have been granted however, to 
Lebanon, Pakistan, and Paraguay. 
- These countries have been targeted for sanctions by American legislators in recent bills or 
by the media and a list of these countries is constantly updated by the US Department of State . 
- As an result of the massacre of student-protestors in Tiananmen Square, the US 
government restricts Chinese purchases of US made military equipment, law enforcement 
materials and modem computer technology . 
- Sanctions are in place today that deny US visas to certain Burmese political leaders and 
that direct American votes against Burma in multilateral lending institutions; The president of 
the US has the option to decide on other additional measures. 
'A Terrible Remedy' 
Ongoing foreign policy sanctions, defined as the "deliberate, government-inspired 
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations," have been 
imposed either multilaterally by the UN or unilaterally by the United States on the 
following nations: 
Target Initial Type of Sanctions Precipitating Event Key Changes to 
Country Year Sanctions 
Angola 1993 Limited trade restrictions Failure to implement Air and travel ban 
(anns and oil embargo); peace agreement ( 1997): Ban on 
Air and travel sanctions UNIT A diamond 
exports ( 1998) 
Azerbaijan 1992 Restriction on financial Embargo of Annenia over 
assistance (including Nagomo-Karabakh 
Overseas Private 
Investment Corp.) 
Burma 1988 Restrictions on aid Repression of political Massachusetts state 
(Myanmar) (including US Export- opposition sanctions ( 1996), Ban 
Import Bank , OPIC), on new U.S. 
travel restrictions, Ban on investments ( 1997) 
trade preferences, 
Investment ban 
Cambodia 1992 Limited trade restrictions Failure to implement Aid reductions ( 1997) 
(log boycott; oil peace agreement; 
embargo) repression of opposition 
parties 
Cameroon 1992 Restrictions on aid Repression of opposition 
parties 
China 1989 Restrictions on financial Tiananmen Square Limited export 
assistance, Exim, OPIC; massacre restriction ( l 991) . 








Comprehensive trade and 
financial sanctions: 
Secondary sanctions to 
inhibit foreign 
investment 
Restrictions on aid 
Restrictions on aid 
Ban on financial 
assistance, including 
Exim, OPIC; Limited 
trade restriction ; Ban on 





Military aid restrictions: 
Ban on arms sales 
Comprehensive trade and 
financial sanctions; 





military interventions in 
Africa (Angola in the 




Nuclear weapons tests 
Political repression, 
especially in East Timor 
Support for terrorism , 
opposition to peace 
process in Middle East; 
efforts to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction 
Cuban Democracy 
Act restricts trade of 
US subsidiaries 






investors in Cuba 
( 1996) 
Limited export 
restrictions ( 1984) 
Import boycott added 
(1987) 
Total export embargo 
( 1995) 
Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act adds secondary 
sanctions against 
foreign firms 
investing in oil sector 
(1996) 
Cultural and athletic 
exchange agreement 
signed with the 
US(l998) 
Ban on the 
importation of Iranian 
rugs and pistachios 
lifted (1999) 
Iraq 1990 Comp rehen sive trade and Invasion of Kuwait ; post-
financial sanctions, war discovery of 
except limited oil sales extensive progr am to 
und er UN oil-for-food acquire weapons of ma ss 
program destruction 
Liberia 1992 Amis embargo Civil War 
Libya 1978 Comprehensive trade and Gadhafi regime support Limited US export 
financial sanctions; Air for terrorism; bombing of restrictions ( 1978) 
travel ban Pan Am Flight # I 03 over US boycotts Libyan 
Lockerby, Scotland oil (1982) 
US imposes 
comprehensive 
sanctions ( 1986) 
UN impose s limited 
trade sanctions; air-
travel ban ( 1992-
1993) 
Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act adds secondary 
sanctions against 
foreign finns 
' investing in oil sector 
(1996) 
Niger 1996 Restrictions on aid Military coup 
Nigeria 1993 Restrictions on aid; US Abrogation of election 
bans all financial results; execution of Ken 
assistance, Exim, OPIC; Saro-Wiwa , other 
Restrictions on arms dissidents 
sales; Travel restrictions 
North Korea 1950 Comprehensive trade and Korean War; possible UN threatens trade 
financial sanctions acquisition of nuclear and financial 
weapons sanctions to forestall 
nuclear weapons 
acquisition (1993-94) 
Pakistan 1979 Ban on financial Nuclear weapons US imposes limited 
assistance, OPIC, Exim, program; nuclear weapons sanctions ( 1979) 
export credit guarantees; tests US waives sanctions 
Ban on bank loans to during Soviet 









Comprehensive trade and 
financial sanctions 
Civil war 
Civil war and human 
rights abuses; support for 
terrorism 
Ban on US assistance, Support for terrorism 
including Exim, OPIC; 
Limited trade restrictions 
Denied most-favored- Vietnam War and 
nation status aftermath; American 
personnel missing in 
action 
Comprehensive trade and 
financial assistance 
sanctions 
Civil war in Bosnia; 
implementation of Dayton 
agreement ending Bosnian 
war; intervention of 
Serbian troops in Kosovo 
Zaire 1990 Restrictions on aid Mobutu corruption and 
suppression of opposition; 
continued repression 
under Kabila re ime 
Zambia 1996 Restrictions on aid Repression of opposition, 
human rights violations 
Source: Institute for International Economics. (Hufbauer, 1998: C04-C07). 
Why America is so eager to use sanctions. 




sanctions ( 1998) 
Aid sanctions ( 1988-
89) 







UN trade sanctions 







Serbia over Kosovo 
(1998) 
Sanctions continued 
after Kabila takeover 
( 1998) 
Since sanctions have become so prevalent as an American foreign policy tool, we 
must ask ourselves first of all why American officials are so eager to use economic 
sanctions as their main foreign policy tool. And secondly, we must also ask ourselves 
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what we have learned from the American reliance on sanctions as a coercive diplomatic 
tool. Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are neither simple nor brief. 
First , as a substitute for the use of military force, sanctions have become the 
bloodless choice of American politicians wishing to demonstrate their resolve against 
dictators and tyrannical governments throughout the 20th century. For, according to 
Charles W. Kegley and Margaret G. Hermann, "the attribution 'democracy' carries with 
it the expectation that such a government will.favor bargaining, mediation, compromise, 
and other nonviolent methods of conflict resolution over .forceful coercion.for resolving 
conflicts. "(Kegley, 1996: 3). In addition, Kegley and Hermann propose that the more 
firmly established a democracy is (like America), the more likely it is to choose a 
nonviolent method of dispute resolution along the lines of economic sanctions. (Kegley, 
1996: 3). 
International 'norms' influence democracies: 
[n most cases, Americans are more likely to approve the use of sanctions over the 
use of military force since international democratic norms promote the use of nonviolent 
means of conflict resolution prior to the use of military force. As a result of these 
'norms', democracies are expected to value, "negotiation, mediation, compromise, 
consensus and other nonviolent methods (like sanctions) over the use of force," by their 
fellow actors on the world stage . (Kegley, 1996: 24). 
In other words, the other members of the international community expect a 
mature democracy like America to choose a nonviolent method of conflict resolution like 
the imposition of economic sanctions over the use of overt military aggression . And with 
this expectation, comes a sense of responsibility that democracies feel - a set of 
reinforcing democratic norms - to use nonviolent diplomatic options to resolve a dispute. 
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This sense of responsibility was in evidence as early as 1769 when American 
leaders felt pressured to promote the use of economic sanctions as a substitute for the use 
of military force. At that time, Thomas Jefferson encouraged applying the "peaceful 
coercion" of economic sanctions to achieve a foreign policy goal. This act by Jefferson, 
perhaps, came close to anticipating Woodrow Wilson's subsequent doctrine of 
encouraging the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Jefferson though, 
unlike Wilson, seemed to anticipate many of the difficulties to be encountered by the 
countries imposing the sanctions when he stated that; "war injures the punisher as much 
as the punished." In this case, the war is an economic war waged through the application 
of economic sanctions, and the injuries involve dollar amounts rather than the body 
counts that result from the use of military force. (Renwick, 1981: 5). 
However, it is not purely out of a sense of responsibility or feelings of obligation 
to the international community that American politicians prefer to apply economic 
sanctions prior to resorting to the use of military force to resolve foreign policy conflicts 
with target nations . The perception of the general population of a democracy is also 
important. In fact, as we often take for granted, the opinion of the general public plays a 
far more important role in the decision making process of a democracy than it does in the 
decision making process of a non-democratic regime. The political leadership of a 
democratic nation like America realizes this fact, and knows further that, without the 
support of the general public, they can not remain in power (failing to win the next 
election). 
Politicians also realize that the American population , for example, "assumes that 
diplomatic channels (or other nonviolent means) will be exhausted entirely before 
military force is applied against the target nation. When responding to Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait, American politicians were quick to adhere to the public opinion of the American 
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people and chose to impose sanctions against Iraq for close to a year before finally 
approving the use of military force. Such is often the case in the US where the 
application of military power is usually seen as the instrument of last resort unless the 
American people, territories, or interests are directly threatened. (Kegley, 1996: 27). This 
is evidenced by the American trend of applying American military force in response to 
"major" attacks on the 'Maine', Pearl Harbor, and recently , in response to Osama bin 
Ladin's attacks on American embassies in Africa. And yet, when the economic 
sanctions failed to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait after almost a year, the American 
president still decided to wait for the support of the American people before finally 
approving the use of military force. 
In many instances, the American political leadership has learned to respect the 
opinion of the American people, and seek their support. This is especially evident 
following the negative reactions of the American people to the use of military force in 
Vietnam. For example, following the constant stream of body bags containing the 
remain s of fallen American servicemen killed in Vietnam, the average American citizen 
placed a high value on diplomatic efforts, bargaining, mediation and the use of sanctions 
prior to the initiation of military strikes. 
Consequently, as witnessed in the case of Iraq, President George Bush learned 
from the experiences of the Vietnam era and attempted to force Saddam Hussein's troops 
out of Kuwait through the imposition of economic sanctions. Later, he followed the 
economic sanctions with an embargo on military shipments before finally approving the 
use of military force (Operation Desert Storm) . Moreover, the economic sanctions that 
were imposed against Iraq were given close to a year to achieve their stated foreign 
policy objectives. And yet, even after a year, Iraq was finally forced to leave Kuwait only 
after facing the allied forces led by the American military. 
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However , even after looking at the Iraqi case, by keeping the casualties of the 
Vietnam case in mind , it is easier to understand why Americans are so eager to approve 
the use of sanctions over the use of force . This pattern of behavior is important to note 
since, if the other members of the international community lose faith in the predisposition 
of democratic nations to use nonviolent methods of conflict resolution , democracies will 
lose the natural protection afforded them by the international expectation that 
democracies are more likely to negotiate than they are to fight. (Kegley, 1996: 4). 
Other reasons why American politicians are more likely to select economic 
sanctions as their chosen foreign policy tool include the lingering effects of the Vietnam 
and Korean War nightmares that still hang over the US. The general public opinion 
regarding the use of military force as a foreign policy tool declined dramatically 
following the constant stream of casualties and sound defeat of American troops fighting 
in Vietnam. Those events, combined with the disappointing results of the Korean War 
have left a bitter taste in the mouths of most Americans regarding the use of milit ary 
force to solve international disputes . Consequently, with all of the lessons learned from 
the Korean War as well as the American loss to Vietnam, American politicians 
themselves encourage the use of nonviolent economic sanctions before ever considering 
the approval of the use of military force . 
Fourth, American politicians have also chosen economic sanctions over the use of 
military force since they have known that they must take some action when faced with 
political, social or economic violations of' American' standards of conduct by foreign 
powers. Initially, for example , the American leadership imposed economic sanctions 
against Cuba in order to force Castro out of power, the Cuban government into 
democratization and the Cuban people into a state of social freedom. However , after 
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maintaining the sanctions against Cuba for nearly forty years without achieving their 
stated foreign policy goals, the justification for the sanctions has changed . 
Today the American leadership claims that the US must maintain its economic 
sanctions against Cuba, although they remain ineffective, to symbolize America's 
opposition to Fidel Castro and his policies to the rest of the world. And thus, the fourth 
reason why America chooses to impose economic sanctions over the use of military force 
is that sanctions are now considered by the American politicians to be a symbolic gesture 
of opposition to the policies of the target nation rather than a legitimate foreign policy 
tool. And yet, when we consider the overwhelming international opposition to America's 
use of economic sanctions (as demonstrated by recent UN votes to condemn the US 
embargo against Cuba) , it should be easy to see that the use of sanctions has failed - even 
as a symbolic foreign policy tool." (Hufbauer, 1998: CO l ). 
General lessons we have learned from the American use of sanctions 
We have learned many valuable lessons from the past eighty years of America's over-
reliance on economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. First, as a substitute for the use 
of military force (like was witnessed with Iraq) , we now know that sanctions are often 
unable to force target nations into making the desired policy changes. To speak bluntly, 
President Wilson was dead wrong when he stated that a, "boycotted nation ... is in sight of 
surrender.. .. That if sanctions are applied, there will be no need for the use of military 
force ."(Padover, 1942: l 08). In fact, maybe only one case of sanctions in five results in 
policy changes that can be directly traced back to sanctions. (Hufbauer, 1998: CO2). 
Democracies vs. dictatorships 
Next, authoritarian dictators like Saddam Hussein have been ready, willing and 
able to wait out economic sanctions imposed by America since they have nothing to fear 
from the people of their own countries. A dominant political dictator, unlike American 
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politicians, cares little about public opinion or gathering consensus. Initially they might 
attempt to rally public support against the "A merican oppressors" as a way to divert 
general sentiments of displeasure away from themselves and towards an overbearing 
foreign power. Then, if they are unable to rally public support against the country 
imposing the sanctions, authoritarian dictators have generally been comfortable using 
military power to subdue domestic uprisings and general public discontent resulting from 
the imposition of economic sanctions. 
Juan J. Lopez categorizes Fidel Castro's regime as a 'sultanistic'/post-totalitarian 
regime. A fundamental reason for this categorization is that, under these types of 
dictatorships, there are no regime softliners (moderates) with enough power and freedom 
to either contain or oppose the dictator. (Lopez, 1997: 240). In a post-totalitarian regime , 
there is a tolerance of some criticism, but "almost all control mechanisms of the party -
state endure and do not evolve." (Lopez, 1997: 240). In Cuba, as in Iraq, political power 
is directly related to the 'sultanistic' leadership ( e.g. Saddam and Castro), "and all 
individuals, groups, and institutions are permanently subject to the unpredictable despotic 
intervention, of the dictator. (Lopez, 1997: 240). 
Additionally, in both Cuba and Iraq, the important political figures derive their 
importance from their connection to their dictators. There is no room for objection, and 
even moderate opposition must be crushed for the dictator to survive. Therefore, 
according to Lopez, the most likely causes for the ouster of dictators like Saddam and 
Fidel are mass uprisings, assassinations, military coups, or the invasion of foreign 
military forces seeking to take over the dictator's country . (Lopez, 1997: 240) . 
In other words, economic sanctions are not likely at all to force such regimes out 
of power without being backed up with the use of military force. In fact, it is one of the 
ironies of economic sanctions that authoritarian dictators - isolated from the media-based 
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eye of world opinion - are less susceptible to the effects of the sanctions than their 
democratic counterparts. As a result, the contrast between Sudan and South Africa or 
between Cuba and Columbia could not be sharper. 
For example, in the Colombian presidential elections of 1998, Andres Pastrana 
was elected to replace Ernesto Sam per following several years of sanctions directed 
personally against Samper by the US. Charging that Samper had accepted $6 million 
dollars (US) from the Cali drug Cartel for his 1994 presidential campaign, the United 
States disqualified Columbia as a recipient of US aid and revoked Samper's entry visa to 
the US (in effect declaring him persona non grata). (Hufbauer, 1998: CO2). The 
American actions were probably not the sole reason for Samper's loss to Pastrana, but 
they most likely contributed to other domestic factors to ensure his defeat. 
Another lesson learned from the use of economic sanctions is that it is naive to 
think of sanctions as an effective alternative to the use of military force when dealing 
with dictators and tyrants. Sanctions had little or no effect on the policies of the saber-
rattling Manuel Noriega in Panama in 1989, Saddam Hussein in Iraq since 1990 and 
Fidel Castro in Cuba since the early 1960s. Only the application of military force ended 
with changes to the policies of Panama and Iraq (not mentioning the Bay of Pigs blunder 
in Cuba). For example, it was only after the United States threatened further air strikes 
against Iraq that Saddam allowed UN arms inspectors into his country. And, only after 
the American invasion of Panama, was Noriega removed from power. 
Unfortunately, when American presidents approve the use of economic sanctions, 
they see them far more often as isolated measures, not as part of an escalating "use of 
force" learning curve. The "use of force" learning curve follows a steady progression 
from diplomatic protests and appeals, to negotiations, followed by economic sanctions, 
and finally to military force. At each step, if the target nation refuses to make the policy 
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changes sought by the sender , it must know that more severe actions are still to come. In 
this scenario, the more belligerent the reaction of the political leadership of the target 
nation, the sharper the learning curve, and the more rapid the imposing country's 
transition from peaceful diplomatic protests to overt military aggression . 
Yet , American politicians seem to refuse to use sanctions as one step along a 
"learning curve" path of coercive foreign policy tools. The unfortunate repercussion of 
this refusal is that the United States has earned a well-deserved reputation for being a soft 
enforcer of its international objections to the policies and practices of target nations. 
And, as a result of this "soft" reputation, target nations know that if they can survive the 
negative effects of economic sanctions , they have no need to fear an escalation to the next 
step of the "use of force" learning curve - overt military aggression. (Hufbauer, 1998: 
CO2). 
The third lesson that we have learned from the American use of economic 
sanctions , is the fact that sanctions negatively impact the lives of the general populace of 
the target nation while simultaneously increasing the grip of the authoritarian dictators 
that the nations imposing the sanctions are trying to oust. When sanctions are imposed 
against a target nation without any plans to escalate to overt military aggression, the 
people of the target nation are hurt the worst. For example, as has been witnessed in 
Cuba and Iraq, the hardest hit are the poor Kurds of northern Iraq, the Shiites in southern 
Iraq and the poor, old and sick Cubans that are unable to get jobs earning American 
dollars in Cuban tourist resorts. Consequently, while the general public suffers, intended 
targets like the political leadership, the military and the economic elite are left unscathed 
by the effects of the economic sanctions imposed against their country. (Hufbauer, 1998: 
CO2). 
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Fourth, is the lesson that sanctions applied hard and fast are more likely to 
succeed (all other circumstances being equal) than sanctions that are less vigorously 
applied over a long period of time . Recently, well-known economic scholars Gary 
Hufbauer, Jeff Schott and Kim Elliott advocated that, "if it were done, when 'tis done, 
then 'twere well it were done quickly." (Elliott, 1997: 6). With this statement, the 
scholars suggest that sanctions are more effective if they are carried out quickly since a 
heavy, slow hand invites both evasion by the target nation and the mobilization of 
domestic opinion in the target country against the sender of the sanctions. 
Sanctions imposed slowly or incrementally and without vigor may simply 
strengthen the target government or dictator at home as he uses his 'power of personality' 
to rally the general populace under the flag of nationalism. Moreover, such measures are 
likely to be undercut over time either by corporations based within the sender's own 
borders or by foreign competitors. Therefore, in support of the need for hard and fast 
economic sanctions, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott reported that the average successful 
cases of sanctions lasted less than three years, while sanctions deemed ineffective lasted 
for more than eight years. (Elliott, 1997: 6) . 
However, it is not the passage of time alone that undermines economic sanctions. 
Other factors are directly related to the length of economic sanctions imposed against a 
target nation. Episodes between allies are generally short, to the point, and often 
successful (as with the American boycott of Japanese automobiles made from less than 
35% American parts). Furthermore, the target country is more likely to receive 
assistance from another major power if the episode continues for a number of years ( e.g. 
Russian economic support for Cuba in light of American economic sanctions . And 
finally, the greater the likelihood that sanctions will succeed from the beginning (all other 
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circumstances being equal), the shorter the inherent period of time necessary for 
sanctions to achieve their stated foreign policy objectives. (Elliott, 1997: 6). 
In any event, the inverse relationship that exists between the likelihood of success 
of economic sanctions and the duration of the sanctions illustrates well the argument 
against gradually increasing sanctions - or "turning the screws" - against the target 
nation. The longer the period that sanctions are in force, the greater the chances that the 
target nation will be able to economically adjust, find alternate trading partners and 
suppliers, build new alliances against the imposing country (Cuba & Russia v. America), 
and mobilize domestic opinion in support of its policies. (Elliott, 1997: 6). But the lesson 
that sanctions applied hard and fast are more likely to succeed poses a dilemma . 
Hard core sanctions, that are intended to severely impact the economic well being 
of the target nation , usually require multilateral cooperation (Iraq), if not UN or 07 
support. While the US may be the sole military superpower on the world stage today, it 
is but part of a cast of co-stars when the global economic players take the stage . 
Therefore , without the cooperation of either the UN or 07 nations, America alone cannot 
deny a target country key imports , critical markets or vital financing . These are some of 
the "key vulnerabilities' that must be effectively targeted if economic sanctions are to 
stand a chance of successfully attaining their foreign policy goals. As a result, the 
justifications for hard or multilateral sanctions also constitute a warning to nations that 
seek to impose sanctions unilaterally. (Hufbauer, 1998: C03) . The justifications also 
constitute a warning because, without multilateral support, unilateral sanctions do not 
stand a chance of succeeding . 
Still, with the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in mind, the US continues to 
adhere to its current sanctions policy and impose sanctions unilaterally against targeted 
countries around the world. This adherence continues since, in the view of politicians 
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like Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton , the US has a special 
responsibility to deal with the misdeeds of misbehaving political leader s. And yet, since 
the cost of using military force against a target nation is too high , and diplomacy is often 
ineffective, politicians like Helms and Burton cave in to both international norms and 
public opinion and call for the application of economic sanctions. 
Then , when politicians like Helms and Burton cave into international pressure and 
public opinion polls , they try to avoid the nightmares remembered from Vietnam and use 
economic sanctions as the global cure-all for both problems abroad and consciences at 
home. And the reason that they choose sanctions, to quote President Wilson out of 
context, is that sanctions are "a terrible remedy ." (Padover, 1942: 108). In other words, 
they are highly ineffective when applied unilaterally and almost never successfully 
achieve their stated foreign policy goals. 
The lack of benefits for using economic sanctions as an American foreign policy tool 
Economic sanctions are an important tool of US foreign policy and have been 
since Woodrow Wilson reintroduced them to the American public shortly after World 
War I. Sanctions, as a foreign policy tool , are often used as one part of an overall 
American response to the actions of foreign leaders, and the policies of target countries , 
to achieve US foreign policy goals. Such goals include: stopping military aggression , 
nuclear proliferation , state-sponsored terrorism , drug trafficking , human rights abuses and 
encouraging democratization, as well as increased social, political and economic 
freedoms. (Schott, 1998: 2). 
Therefore, when used together with diplomatic protests , negotiations and other 
measures like threatening military aggression, sanctions are used to symbolically 
demonstrate the determination of the US to see the target nation alter its objectionable 
course. In addition, the use of economic sanctions also expresses American outrage, calls 
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on the target nation to bend to America's will , and attempts to deter other countries from 
repeating the same mistakes in the future. Consequently, to effectively follow this 
pattern, sanctions should not be used separately from other diplomatic or military courses 
of action. Rather, to be effective, economic sanctions should be "consistent with and 
well-integrated into an overall US policy response ," (Schott, 1998: 2) that allows for the 
use of military force. 
In addition, economic sanctions should be custom-designed in order to meet the 
specific objectives of each individual case. No "cookie-cutter" approach to the 
application of economic sanctions can ever be successful since both the American foreign 
policy goals as well as the target nation's economic vulnerabilities vary from case to 
case. For example, a boycott of oil exports from Cuba would be about as effective as a 
boycott of sugar imports from Iraq. And, sanctions need to be applied to the most 
vulnerable areas of the target's economy so as to have the greatest impact on the target 
nation's political leadership . (Schott , 1998: 2). 
However, America fails to tailor its use of economic sanctions on a case-by-case 
basis and broadly applies economic sanctions as its foreign policy 'band-aid' . A foreign 
policy 'band-aid' favored by American policy makers mainly since they provide a middle 
of the road option located somewhere between doing nothing at all, diplomatic protests 
and negotiations and the use of military force . Economic sanctions also make an 
attractive choice for American policy makers because they are willing to suffer the 
negative effects of economic sanctions on American businesses and the American 
economy more than they are willing to suffer the negative repercussions of a military 
engagement with the targeted country. (i.e. Vietnam and Korea). Yet, with the exception 
of Cuba and North Korea (where economic sanctions followed failed attempts to use 
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military force), economic sanctions have only recently been used by the US as one step 
along the foreign policy path towards overt military aggression. 
The ineffectiveness of recent economic sanctions has forced America's political 
leadership to approve the use of military force in countries like Panama, Haiti, Soma! ia, 
Iraq, Libya and Kosovo. And the use of military force was approved either to reinforce 
the message being sent through the application of economic sanctions or to coerce the 
target nations to finally abide by US foreign policy demands. During Operation Desert 
Storm against Iraq for example, President George Bush deemed it necessary to deploy the 
US military against Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard. A decision that President 
Bush made following the inability of the year-old US-imposed economic sanctions to 
force Saddam into withdrawing his troops from Kuwait. (Schott, 1998: 2). 
The Costs 
Next , even though it is difficult to pin down the benefits associated with the use of 
economic sanctions, it is fairly easy to track down the costs. Economic sanctions not 
only deprive the sender (the US) of potential profits from lost international trade 
transactions, but also harm corporations working in the export industry of the sender. 
Such export-oriented corporations are among some of the most productive businesses in 
the American economy today. Additionally, as the American use of economic sanctions 
has expanded over the past century, tensions have increased between the US, her allies 
and the other industrialized nations of the world. 
In fact, many American businesses constantly complain through the American 
media that the effects of unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the US go beyond 
their intended targets, beyond the economic sectors of the target nation. And that the 
negative effects of the sanctions are often felt by American companies long after the 
sanctions are lifted. The negative effects of economic sanctions country are often felt 
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harder by American companies when they earn a reputation for being "unreliable 
suppliers" shortly after economic sanctions are imposed. For example, sanctioned 
nations may avoid buying from US companies even after sanctions are lifted and 
continue to trade only with non-US companies to avoid risking the economic deprivation 
that they experienced immediately following the initial application of American 
sanctions. Such prejudice against American companies places them at a distinct 
disadvantage in international markets in which they must constantly compete against 
foreign competitors. 
In any event, exports sales lost today by American companies may also mean 
lower exports even after the sanctions are lifted. This could happen if the US companies 
are not be able to supply intermediate manufactured goods and replacement parts for 
factories and machinery sold to the target nation by foreign competitors during the course 
of the sanctions. Foreign firms that supply intermediate manufactured goods and 
replacement parts have been known to intentionally design their final product s without 
American-made parts in order to maintain a monopoly in the target nation 's market once 
economic sanctions are lifted . 
In a $7 trillion dollar US economy, the potential costs incurred by American 
companies, as a direct result of US sanctions imposed against other countries may not be 
great, but they are felt. Often, the negative effects of US economic sanctions on US-
based companies are concentrated in sectors and felt by businesses that focus on 
international trade and investment. And, unfortunately for the American economy, these 
companies are often the most competitive and well off in the US. 
In fact, according to Kim Elliott, workers in plants involved in exporting are more 
productive and more highly compensated than are the workers of comparable companies 
that do not export their goods. In addition, employment growth is nearly 20 percent 
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higher in exporting companies and plants than in those that have never exported or have 
stopped exporting their goods. And finally, another sign that export-oriented companies 
are valuable to the American economy (and should be protected), is the fact that 
exporting firms are less likely to go out of business in an average year (Elliott , 1997: 3). 
And, as a result, are more likely to make stable contributions to America's GNP. 
Therefore, with a rapidly changing and interdependent global economy, unilateral 
economic sanctions have become decreasingly effective for the US government a foreign 
policy option, while simultaneously becoming increasingly costly for American owned 
companies. As a result, if sanctions are to have any chance at all of producing favorable 
outcomes, they must be formatted on a case-by-case basis not only to negatively impact 
the economy of the target nation, but also to protect the economic well being of American 
companies . (Elliott, 1997: 3-4) . 
The decline of sanctions as an effective American foreign policy tool 
Perhaps many extemporaneous factors contributed to the decline in effectiveness 
of US imposed economic sanctions, but a large part of the explanation must be based on 
the ever-expanding economic interdependence that we have witnessed in the past few 
decades on the world stage. Consequently, the United States has slipped from its once-
held position of global dominance in the world economy and its ability to gain economic 
leverage against the other nations of the world is constantly declining. And, given that 
the United States' slow, but inevitable slide from its once lofty position of global 
economic dominance has continued during the past ten years, or even sped up, there is 
little reason to expect that the effectiveness of American economic sanctions has 
conversely improved. (Elliott, 1997: 2). 
Therefore, the American attempts to punish foreign governments and pursue 
policy changes through the imposition of economic sanctions is a foreboding signpost on 
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the road to global economic freedom and increased economic interdependence between 
the world's economies. That the use of unilateral economic sanctions by the US has 
actually increased in recent decades is a sure sign that America's diplomatic relations 
with both our major trading partners and the target nations are in jeopardy. 
In many instances, American-imposed economic sanctions jeopardize diplomatic 
relations because they send a contradictory message regarding US beliefs . For example, 
the underlying messages that lay behind the use of economic sanctions go against 
America's stated belief in a free market economy, as well as the positive influence of 
private investment in target nations. When American policy makers state on the one 
hand how much American trade will positively influence the domestic policies of China 
and Vietnam, while simultaneously denying that American trade with Cuba will have the 
same effect, they are sending a contradictory message. In addition, claims that US trade 
will not positively influence countries like Cuba also fail to recognize the fact that 
American companies like Coke or Ford help to foster greater economic freedom , as well 
as promote 'American' ideals to the people of America's trading partners around the 
world. 
In addition to sending a contradictory message, economic sanctions are also a bad 
foreign policy choice because they often do not work (they often fail to meet their stated 
foreign policy goals). Out of the 78 cases of US imposed economic sanctions since 
World War I, not a single example besides Columbia can be found where US unilateral 
economic sanctions forced a target nation to change its basic political structure or 
significant political policies . In fact , the 40 year old economic embargo of Cuba, a tiny 
island nation less than 90 miles from the "soft underbelly" of America's southern 
coastline, is a monument to the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions as a 
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coercive foreign policy tool. And yet, the US still chooses to maintain unilateral 
economic sanctions against a number of countries around the world. 
To counter the anti-economic sanctions sentiment, some supporters of economic 
sanctions point to South Africa as one instance where US economic sanctions where 
successfully applied, even though the facts tell a different story. It is unrealistic to credit 
an American Congress's vote for sanctions in October of 1986 with either the 
effectiveness of the economic sanctions against South Africa or the overthrow of 
Apartheid. Also, it is also unrealistic to credit the US with the success of the sanctions 
against South Africa since it was not the economic pressure levied against South Africa 
alone that forced the end to Apartheid. 
On the contrary, the well-organized domestic political forces, after a three-
decades-long struggle, were the ones that achieved the peaceful overthrow of a racist 
system that had no moral ground to stand on. Those domestic efforts, combined with 
pressure from multilateral economic sanctions and efforts of governrnents and local 
communities around the world, finally forced the white-minority government to cave in 
to political , social and economic pressures and loosen its death grip on political power in 
South Africa. And yet, many American politicians look to the South African case of 
economic sanctions as another reason why economic sanctions should be applied more 
often. (Elliott, 1997: 3). 
Even the goals of sanctions are misguided 
The goals of US economic sanctions are often unrealistic and almost always 
misguided . A bill seriously considered in the American Congress in 1996 would have 
banned all investment in Burma (Myanmar) unless the President of the United States first 
certified that an elected official of Burma had been allowed to take office. Clearly, the 
details of the situation in Burma differ from those of other nations like Cuba. Yet, setting 
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a standard that requires a trading partner to have an elected government in power, sets a 
dangerous precedence . It sets a dangerous precedence not only since it encourages some 
to speculate that US companies might some day be prevented from doing business in the 
vast majority of countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, but also since it illustrates 
one side of a two-faced American position. America's position regarding this matter 
seems two-faced when we witness the normalization of trade relations taking place 
between the US and countries like Vietnam and China while we simultaneously pursue 
the imposition of economic sanctions against countries like Burma and Cuba. 
Recently, even America 's major trading partners have refused to support most 
US-imposed economic sanctions. And they will almost certainly refuse to support any 
future congressionally imposed ban similar to the one being proposed for Burma . This 
should trouble America's political leadership since, to have any hope of effectiveness, 
such a boycott would require the cooperation of China , Singapore and many other Asian 
nation s. A level of international cooperation that America is not likely to receive. 
In fact, Asian countries have chosen closer economic ties with Burma over 
isolation , having invited Burma to participate in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations . Subsequently, as has happened elsewhere in the world, US unilateral sanctions 
against Burma will serve primarily to transfer business from American owned companies 
to foreign firms without accomplishing the important foreign policy goals that US 
economic sanctions are legally based upon. 
Contrary to the current practice, as the main economic characters playing out their 
role on the international economic stage, American companies should be encouraged to 
enter, not discouraged from entering new markets around the world. US foreign 
investment is not only profitable for the American companies that invest wisely, it also 
helps to foster greater economic growth and prosperity among their corporate employees 
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living in the target nations. And, as a result, the companies that invest in target nations 
help those nations advance their economic conditions, social atmosphere and political 
practices from within via positive economic reinforcement, rather than from without, 
through the negative economic impact of unilateral sanctions. 
Examples of positive economic reinforcement are the companies that engaged in 
long-term investment in Burma and other target nations and built schools, hospitals and 
roads. These are services that the local governments could not have afforded on their 
own. Then, in addition to providing economic benefits, American companies can also 
simultaneously introduce the people of the target nation to the principles of peaceful 
democratic reforms in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation rather than one of one 
of fear and loathing . 
WHY CHOOSE CUBA FOR THIS CASE STUDY 
As previously mentioned, throughout history , economic sanctions have been 
continuously used as coercive foreign policy tools. First, economic sanctions have been 
used to protect economic and commercial interests when faced with 'unfair' international 
competition . And second, they have been used in attempts to put pressure on target 
nations . Pressure used to either influence the domestic political policy decisions of the 
target nation or to destabilize the 'sultanistic' dictators or regimes that are seen as 
'hostile' or 'unfriendly' by the nation imposing the sanctions. (Alerassool, 1993: 1 ). 
However , as history has proven, economic sanctions have seldom been able to, 
"roll back military aggression, have had a limited capacity to impair their targeted 
regime's daily operations , or to force the targeted regime into changing its domestic 
policies, and have never toppled a dictator." (Lopez, 1997: 70). Additionally, since the 
effectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions depends on so many variables over which 
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the sanctioning country has little control, it is not surprising that sanctions often inflict 
only minor and/or temporary economic damage on the target country . 
Consequently, being unable to either inflict sufficient economic damage on the 
target country's economy, or to obtain sufficient control over the target nation's policy 
making process, the foreign policy goals of the country imposing the economic sanctions 
cannot be achieved - and the sanctions fail. For, as Donald Losman stated, "economic 
harm," resulting from economic sanctions , "must be translated through the target state's 
political system and into policy or regime changes. But, to the degree that dictators like 
Castro prevail, or charismatic leaders engender popular support in spite of ( or often with 
the aid of sanctions), the desired political changes rarely if ever occur." (Losman, 1979: 
41). 
Thus , with the inability of economic sanctions to attain their stated foreign policy 
goals in mind , the author decided to study one case in which economic sanctions should 
have worked. Therefore, after looking at the 'key vulnerabilities ' of various countries 
targeted by US imposed economic sanctions, the author decided to study the case of US 
economic sanctions imposed against Cuba . 
Initially, the variables that set Cuba apart from the rest of the targeted nations 
included its small size and population - thereby limiting its original prospects and ability 
to conduct trade in the international market. Then, another variable that suggested to the 
author that US economic sanctions should have worked, was its geographic location, 
"within what has historically been considered America ' s backyard ." (Schwab, 1999: 
167). 
Located only 90 miles from the "soft underbelly" of the US, Cuba had become enveloped 
by both the American trade markets and American companies with the US being 
responsible for more than 68.9 percent of Cuba's total trade. (Wallensteen, 1983: 104). 
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And finally, Cuba's over-reliance on sugar as its main export should have made it 
extremely vulnerable to the initial American embargoes barring the exportation of Cuban 
sugar to the US. And yet, even though Cuba seemed to have been 'ripe for the picking' 
by US imposed sanctions, Fidel Castro remains in power nearly forty years later. 
Indeed, no one would have faulted an American foreign policy scholar of the 
1960s for suggesting that economic sanctions imposed by the US against Cuba should 
effectively attain their foreign policy goals. With the US dominating the Cuban import 
and export markets, the close proximity of Cuba to the US, the limited variety of 
domestic production and the small number of trading partners, sanctions should have 
succeeded. Therefore, the study of the American sanctions imposed against Cuba (the 
Cuban case study) was chosen more for its inherent chances for early success than it was 
for its long history of ineffectiveness. In any case, if US imposed economic sanctions 
should have worked anywhere, and against any country, they should have worked against 
Cuba because of its economic vulnerabilities. And, if the American sanctions had 
worked against Cuba , the viability of economic sanctions as an effective foreign policy 
tool would have been proven. However, Cuba does have a dictator, so one would not 
expect sanctions to work there as effectively as they worked against countries with 
democratic forms of government. (like Columbia). 
However, if we find through this study that the American sanctions failed to work 
(failed to attain their stated foreign policy goals) against Fidel Castro's Cuban regime, 
through an especially vulnerable Cuban economy, then it is unlikely that they will work 
anywhere else. Cuba was a good case to look at not only since Cuba was economically 
vulnerable, but also since Castro's position as an authoritarian/sultanistic dictator enabled 
him to crush opposition that might have forced out the leadership in a more democratic 
nation. Consequently, it should be easy to see why the author chose Cuba for this study. 
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A study of the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions at attaining their stated foreign 
policy goals. 
First , the author chose the Cuban case to find out whether or not the stated foreign 
policy goals of economic sanctions could be achieved if the sanctions are imposed 
against a particularly vulnerable target. Second, the author chose the Cuban case for this 
paper to prove that, even when the target country is potentially very vulnerable to the 
negative economic effects of the sender's economic sanctions, economic sanctions are 
unlikely to achieve their stated foreign policy goals. And finally, the author chose the 
Cuban case for this study since the US sanctions against that country have had close to 
forty years to attain their foreign policy goals. And, as logic suggests, if economic 
sanctions have failed to achieve their foreign policy goals after nearly forty years, 
chances are that the sanctions will not achieve them at all. For, according to Hufbauer, 
Schott and Elliott, "successful economic sanctions lasted an average of only 2.9 years, 
while sanctions that lasted longer than eight years tended to fail." (Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 
1 ). In fact, only 21 % of the cases imposed in pursuit of even modest foreign policy goals 
between 1973 and 1990 succeeded. (Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 8). 
Detailing the embargo: a table of the main facets and goals of the American 
economic sanctions imposed against Cuba 
The overarching goal of US policy toward Cuba is to promote a peaceful transition to 
democracy in the island nation. 
To that end, America's foreign policy efforts against Cuba are proceeding on the 
following track: 
• To place pressure on the regime for change through comprehensive economic 
sanctions; 
• To reach out to the Cuban people; 
• To promote and protect human rights in Cuba; 
• To support multilateral efforts that press for the democratization of Cuba; and 
• To encourage migration-related agreements between Cuba and the US to promote the 
safe, orderly and legal migration of Cubans to America. 
What the US sanctions against Cuba allow: 
► Food and medical sales to Cuban entities as well as the Cuban government (following 
a July 21, 2000 vote by the American Congress). 
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► Humanitarian aid 
► Family reunification visits by all Cuban-Americans, once a year. 
► Visits by licensed US citizens such as academics, journalists , artists , humanitarian 
group members , and sports teams . 
► Anyone sending up to $1200 a year to relatives or friends in Cuba, except senior 
government or Communist Party officials . 
► Direct flights from Miami, New York and Los Angeles. 
► Direct telephone service. 
What the US sanctions against Cuba ban: 
► Cuban import s, except cultural materials such as books and Music CDs . People 
returning from legal visits can bring back cigars and rum 
► US investments or property purchases 
► Exports of US products other than food or medicine 
► World Bank and International Monetary Fund credits to Cuba , through American-
backed vetoes in those agencies . 
► Tourism-related travel to Cuba. 
► Business deals by foreign subsidiaries of US-owned firms . 
► Visits to US ports by ships that have docked in Cuba within the preceding 180 days . 
► And foreign firms "trafficking" in US properties appropriated or nationalized by 
Castro in the early 1960s. 
Source: I) USAID <http ://www. usaid .gov/co untries /cu/mand-cub .htm> 
2)The Miami Herald <http ://www. herald .com/herald /content /docs/085 l 26.htm > 
Background on Cuba's historical ties to the US 
On January 7, 1959, the government of the United States officially recognize d the 
gove rnment of President Fidel Castro of Cuba. However , after the US refused to sign 
trade agreements with Cuba, the Cuban government of Castro signed a trade agreement 
with the USSR. In this agreement the Soviet Union agreed to buy sugar, citrus and other 
goods from Cuba as well as to supply Cuba with much needed crude oil. This agreement 
was especially important to a Cuban industrial sector that is highly energy inefficient and 
environmentally unfriendly . 
Such "offsetting assistance", given to Cuba by the Soviet Union, eroded almost 
immediately the chances for the success of any of the US sanctions imposed against 
Cuba. Often referred to as the "black knight corollary" by Hofbauer, a third country like 
the Soviet Union can quickly erode away the wall of economic deprivation constructed 
by economic sanctions by providing financial aid to the target country. "Black Knight" 
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aid is especially effective when the policy goals of the economic sanctions include the 
destabilization of the target government as well as disruption of military expansionism 
abroad. (Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 5). Moreover , after the signing of the Soviet-Cuban trade 
agreement, the US-Cuban relations deteriorated further in a downward spiral of imposing 
tit for tat trade restrictions which finally ended with the US imposition of full economic 
sanctions against Cuba in 1962. 
Then, later in 1960, American oil firms stopped refining oil purchased from the 
USSR on advice from the US State Department. Cuba responded to this refusal by 
nationalizing the American-owned oil refineries. This Cuban nationalization of 
American-owned factories , in tum, forced President Eisenhower to cancel the US import 
quota of raw Cuban sugar. This was extremely painful for the Cuban economy since 
Cuban sugar sales to the US up to that point were approximately 3 million tons each year 
(more than half of Cuba ' s total sugar exports). In response, Cuba then expropriated and 
nationalized all American-owned property within Cuba (valued at approximately $1 
billion) while simultaneously initiating trade restrictions against the importation of all US 
products . (Krinsky and Golove , 1993: 108; Newfarmer , 1982: 128; Schrieber, 1973: 387). 
In response to Cuba's restriction on the importation of American goods, the US 
decided to impose an embargo on all exports to Cuba except for medicine and food. 
Then , in October of 1960, the US extended the embargo to cover all foreign subsidiaries 
of American companies, reduced the American import quota for Cuban sugar to zero, and 
vowed to prevent ships carrying goods to and from Cuba from carrying any cargo owned 
by the US government. (Doxey, 1980: 35; Losman , 1979: 21,26) . 
Next, in 1961, Castro realized that his best chance for economic survival was to 
replace the American market with the market of the Soviet Union. To help with this 
move, he claimed publicly to be a Marxist-Leninist whose government-led revolution 
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was to be a socialist /ant-imperialist one. Following this statement, President Kennedy 
severed all US-Cuban diplomatic relations, restricted the travel of American citizens and 
residents to Cuba, and launched plans for the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion . 
(Newfarmer, 1982: 128). 
In January of 1962, the Organization of American States (OAS) voted 20 to 1 
(Cuba voting against) to declare that the Marxist-Leninist ideology is incompatible with 
the inter-American system. As a result, a two-thirds majority decided that Cuba had 
"voluntarily" left the OAS by declaring its Marxist-Leninist affiliation. (New York 
Times, 31JAN62: A 1 quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 7). 
Then, following the January decisions of the OAS, President John F. Kennedy 
proclaimed by executive order that the US had banned virtually all imports of Cuban 
goods . At that time, he also promised, "to do something about Castro, to destabilize the 
Castro regime and cause its overthrow , or at a minimum , to make an example of the 
regime by inflicting as much damage on it as possible ." (Newfarmer , 1982: 128-129) . In 
tum , Kennedy's decision was followed by an OAS vote to suspend all military trade with 
Cuba . And shortly thereafter, Cuba protested the OAS decision to the UN Security 
Council and asked the UN to suspend the decision of the OAS , but the UN took no 
action . (Doxey, 1980: 35) . 
Later, in August 1962, the American Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, 
including an amendment banning aid to "any country which furnishes aid to the present 
government of Fidel Castro in Cuba. This clause was further amended the next year to 
order the withholding of foreign aid from countries that allow ships flying their national 
flag to carry goods to and from Cuba." (Krinsky & Golove, 1993: 112-113). This action 
was followed by the Cuban Missile Crisis which forced the US to tighten the ratchet of 
sanctions another notch. 
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During the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 23, 1962), OAS unanimously supported 
the US "quarantine" of Cuba, and authorized members to take measures, including the 
use of military forces, to ensure "hemispheric security". This allowed the US to justify 
its naval blockade of Cuba's ports and the quarantine was not lifted until the end of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis on November 20, 1962. (Doxey, 1980: 36). 
Next, in February of 1963, President Kennedy ordered the prohibition of 
shipments of cargoes paid for by the US government, on foreign-flag ships that have been 
in Cuban ports. He also encouraged maritime unions to boycott ships named on the US 
government blacklist because of their trade relations with Cuba. (Krinsky & Go love, 
1993: 112-113). However, illicit trade with Cuba continued and President Kennedy felt 
that he had no choice but to invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act which froze all 
Cuban-owned assets in the US. The order to invoke the (TWEA) also transferred 
enforcement of the US sanctions against Cuba from the Department of Commerce to the 
Treasury Department. And, under American pressure, NA TO countries agreed to halt 
military trade with Cuba while being allowed to continue economic trade with Cuba. 
(Krinsky & Golove, 1993: 114; Doxey, 1980: 3 7). 
Most of the 1960's restrictions against Cuba, following Kennedy's assassination, 
were based on Under Secretary of State George Ball's suggestion to revamp the purpose 
of the economic sanctions. Ball proposed that the purpose of the sanctions against Cuba 
be revamped to: 'reduce Castro's ability to export the communist insurgency that brought 
Castro to power, to show the Cuban people that Castro cannot serve their interests, to 
demonstrate that Communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere, and to raise the 
costs to the Soviet Union of maintaining its sphere of influence over Cuba." (Doxey, 
1980: 37). 
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Then, in 1975, US-Cuban diplomatic talks towards normalization began after the 
OAS lifted all collective sanctions against Cuba and the US decided to allow foreign 
subsidiaries of American companies to trade with Cuba. (Lowenfeld, 1977: 32). 
However, US-Cuban normalization talks ended when Cuba launched a large-scale 
military intervention in Angola . As part of this intervention, Cuba deployed 36,000 
troops to Angola followed by US threats of military action if Cuba ever sends more 
troops to another country. 
Later, in September of 1977, Cuba withdrew some of its troops from Angola and 
established interests sections with the US in their respective capital cities . Following the 
establishment of the interest sections, President Jimmy Carter (sarcastically called "the 
peacemaker") proposed the establishment of a fishing agreement with Cuba, loosened 
restrictions on travel to Cuba and opened discussions with Cuba on a wide array of 
issues. Then, later that year, Congress repealed the provision of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 banning aid to countries permitting their cargo ships to carry goods to and 
from Cuba. And, as a direct result of Congress's actions, the National Security Council 
destroyed the "ship blacklist ". (Newfarmer, 1982: 129; Krinsky & Go love, 1993: 118). 
According to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence 
Todman, "The Carter Administration had begun an effort to improve relations with Cuba, 
but normalization was supposed to take a long time and depended on many factors , 
including Cuba's behavior in the international arena ... The United States desired 
improved relations with Cuba, improvement in human rights in Cuba, the release of all 
political prisoners (thousands of whom have been jailed for years), more responsible 
international behavior by Cuba (especially in Africa), and compensation to US citizens 
and companies whose properties were taken over by the Cuban government." 
(Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, pp. 56-67). However, in Castro's opinion, 
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Cuba had already offered to settle on a compensation package for the American-owned 
properties, but the US refused to accept the terms of the deal. 
Then, in 1980, Cuba broke from its conciliatory trend and sent 20,000 troops to 
Ethiopia. The deployment of Cuban troops to Ethiopia as well as the discovery of a 
Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba led President Carter to establish the Caribbean Joint 
Task Force Headquarters in Florida and warn that Cuban troops would not be allowed to 
deploy against neighboring countries . (Newfarmer , 1982: 130). Fidel decided to "thumb 
his nose" at President Carter and initiated the raft armada of Cuban refugees from the 
port of Mariel. Eventually, the flotilla of rafts, boats and ships carried almost 125,000 
Cubans illegally across the 90 miles of ocean that lies between the shores of Cuba and 
Florida. This event later became known as the "Mariel boatlift" . 
Presid ent Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 and initiated tighter economic 
sanction s against Cuba . He also proposed Radio Marti (Radio Free Cuba) and claimed 
that Cuba was the instigator behind the Marxist powers in Nicaragua, the communist 
rebels in El Salvador and the military junta in Grenada. In tum Reagan later 
characterized Grenada as a "virtual surrogate" of Cuba and attempted to regain Latin 
Americ an cooperation against Castro. (Newfarmer, 11982: 132; Shulz, 1983: 3 7). 
According to former Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Enders, the Reagan 
administration sought to tighten the noose of economic sanctions against Cuba , "in 
response to the Cuban promotion of leftist revolution in Central America, especially El 
Salvador." (Washington Post, l 5DEC8 l: A6 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 9). 
Therefore, knowing the tradition of the Reagan Administration (Irangate / Iran-Contra 
Scandal), it is easy to see how important it was to President Reagan to stop the spread of 
communism (The Evil Empire) in Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean. 
Following the Reagan era, the objectives of the US economic sanctions against Cuba 
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have been often categorized under two main headings: the overthrow of Castro and the 
containment of the spread of communism in Latin America. (Roca, 1987: 87). 
In 1984, the United States and Cuba negotiated an agreement to resume norn1al 
immigration activities interrupted after the Mariel "boatlift", and to return people to Cuba 
from the "boatlift" that were then excludable under US immigration laws. However, 
Cuba decided to suspend this agreement in May of 1985 after the US finally got Radio 
Marti off the ground and began to broadcast anti-Castro information to Cuba. But, the 
agreement was accepted once again by Cuba after it began jamming Radio Marti 
broadcasts with the aid of the Soviet-made version of America's "Compass Call" (a radio 
transmission jamming platform). And yet, today, Radio Marti has attracted a large 
following of its short-wave radio broadcasts . (US Dept. Of State, 1998: 7) 
In 1985, following Angola's announcement that it was willing to phase out the 
Cuban troop presence in return for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, Castro 
stated that he would accept US mediation efforts in the region. Castro also stated that the 
number of Cuban troops stationed in Ethiopia had been reduced to a "symbolic level". 
As a result, his comments seemed to indicate that there would be a substantial lowering 
of the Cuban military's presence in Africa. This reduction took place , both as popular 
support of Cuba within those countries waned, and as the Soviet Union's own "sphere of 
influence" withdrew from Africa . (Washington Post , 6FEB85: Al as quoted in Hutbauer, 
et al, 1990: 9). 
In 1988 and 1989, Cuba seemed to have wanted to renew talks with the US about 
improving the two countries' bilateral relationship. In 1988, Cuba, Angola and South 
Africa reached an agreement under which Cuban troops were to leave Angola, and South 
Africa was to withdraw troops from Namibia and implement a UN plan for a transition to 
an independent Namibian nation. (US Dept. of State, 1998: 16). Then, in 1989, Castro 
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offered to cooperate in slowing drug trafficking in an apparent attempt to improve 
relations with the US. That same year, as President George Bush campaigned for a 
Cuban-American congressional candidate in Miami, Florida, he stated that he would like 
to normalize relations with Cuba also, but not until, "it reforms its political system and 
ends its history of human rights abuses." (Washington Post, 22JAN90: A I as quoted in 
Hufbauer, et al, I 990: 10). However, political upheaval, and the failure of attempted 
economic reforms disrupted Soviet trade with Cuba and the US decided to take a "wait 
and see approach" to the events in the USSR before pursuing Bush's comments any 
further. 
Then, in 1990, President Bush threatened to veto a bill that contained a provision 
to ban foreign subsidiaries of American companies from doing any business with Cuba, 
potentially affecting almost $320 million in annual trade for the US. Rumor had it that 
Canada and the United Kingdom had expressed strong opposition to the extraterritorial 
nature of the proposed measure. (International Trade Reporter, 21 NOV 1990: 1770). 
Following this action from President Bush, Castro completely withdrew his Cuban troops 
from Angola and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev announced that he would withdraw 
all Soviet troops from Cuba. (Washington Post, 24MA Y9 I: A39 as quoted in Hufbauer, 
et al, 1990: I 0). 
Then, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, Russia ended 
its economic assistance to Cuba, including subsidized oil sales. (Christian Science 
Monitor, 9JAN92: 1). Prior to which action, Castro almost prophetically stated that: 
"For decades our (Cuban) plans were based on the existence of several socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe in addition to the Soviet Union, with whom we have 
signed agreements and established extensive economic relations. We do not 
know what kind of governments these countries will install. We have no security 
as to what trade will be like for us in the future, and we have complete uncertainty 
for the period of 1991-95 (After the current 'five-year plan' runs out)." (Financial 
Times, 03MAR90: 6). 
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The Cuban economy did suffer a dramatic drop following the Soviet collapse and Cuba's 
economic security remained extremely vulnerable as Castro predicted. And yet , Castro 
was able to remain in power even after the Cuban economy's collapse . He remained in 
power in spite of the negative effects caused by the US economic sanctions by repressing 
any opposition mounted against him as a result of frustration caused by the lagging 
Cuban economy. 
Next , in 1992, presidential candidate Bill Clinton pledged to support the Cuban 
Democracy Act while on a Florida campaign stop . In response to this pledge, George 
Bush issued an executive order restricting access to US ports of third-country ships that 
have carried cargo to and from Cuba. Further , in order to limit Cuba's hard currency 
earnings, President Bush permitted direct air charters to resume service between Cuba 
and the US . These air charters, used for humanitarian shipments, prevented the Cuban 
government from charging high fees for package s of US origin routed through Mexico . 
(International Trade, 22APR92: 717). 
Representative Robert Torricelli (D-N.J .) followed Bush's executive order 
regarding air charter flights to Cuba in September of 1992 with the introduction of the 
Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). The bill passed both the House (276-135) and the Senate 
(61-24) and forbade foreign subsidiaries of US companies from dealing with Cuba . The 
bill also prohibited any ship that had docked in Cuban harbors from entering any US 
ports for at least 180 days and called for a tern1ination of aid to any country that provided 
economic assistance to Cuba. However, the legislation encouraged reaching out to the 
Cuban people and permitted reducing certain sanctions (namely telecommunications) "in 
carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba." (Inside US 
Trade, 9OCT92: 8) But the CDA faced immediate opposition from the UK and Canada 
when those two countries barred any US subsidiaries within their borders from 
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complying with the CDA requirements. (Inside US Trade I 6OCT92: 11; Journal of 
Commerce, 22OCT92: 4A) . 
Later that same year, Russia signed a series of new trade agreements with Cuba, 
including a new oil-for-sugar agreement, under which Russia was expected to deliver 2.3 
million tons of oil in exchange for 1.5 million tons of sugar in 1993. This is down from 
13 million tons of oil in 1990 and 10 million tons in 1991. (Christian Science Monitor, 
9JAN92: 1). This newer agreement altered severely the previous deal that Cuba had held 
with the former Soviet Union. 
As part of the Cuban trade agreement with the former Soviet Union, Russia was 
supposed to buy Cuban sugar at a price well above that of the world standard while 
simultaneously selling oil to Cuba at a greatly discounted price. Cuba was reeling from 
the American move to cut off all sugar purchases and was lucky that the Soviet Union 
stepped in to take up the slack that the US left. However, Cuba was not the grateful 
customer that the Soviet Union might have otherwise hoped . 
On average, Cuba needed at least IO million tons of Soviet crude oil annually to 
fuel its inefficient industrial complex throughout the 1970s and 1980s. And yet , in 
addition to the required 10 million tons, Cuba would regularly purchase another three or 
four million tons of extra discounted Soviet crude oil. This discounted crude oil, in tum, 
would then be resold on the world market in order to increase Cuba's hard currency 
reserves . Then , in order to insulate himself from the negative effects of the US economic 
sanctions, Castro hoarded the hard currency reserves in "protected" accounts outside of 
normal Cuban economic channels. (Hufbauer , et al, 1990: 6). 
However, by the end of 1992, international tolerance of the American economic 
sanctions against Cuba waned. One example of this took place in November of 1992 
when the UN General Assembly voted 59 to 3, with 79 abstentions, to urge the lifting of 
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the economic sanctions against Cuba. Only Romania and Israel joined the US in 
opposing the UN condemnation of the sanctions. And , as mentioned earlier in this paper, 
by 1997 only Israel consistently voted with the US in favor of the sanctions. (Washington 
Post, 29NOV92: C6 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 12). 
After recognizing the increased international opposition to the sanctions, the 
Clinton administration announced that it was going to allow American phone companies 
to improve phone service between Cuba and the US. Clinton initially approved the 
installation of advanced telecommunication lines since the US sanctions had not been 
able to prevent contact between Cuban-Americans and their relatives in Cuba with the 
old phone system in place. In addition to having been able to maintain contact with 
relatives back in Cuba, thousands of exiles have been able to go to Cuba to visit relatives 
over the years along with scholars and academics that were allowed to travel to maintain 
contacts with their Cuban counterparts. Consequently , the frequency of Cuban-American 
contacts has increased only after the Cuban Democracy Act legally "pushed" for the 
improvement of the phone system between the two countries. A move that was made in 
order to improve and foster personal contacts between the citizens of the two nations. 
However, President Clinton's move to improve the phone services was criticized 
by Fidel's younger brother and vice-president, Raul Castro . Raul denounced the US 
telephone policy as a "rotten carrot" and exhorted Cubans to resist it. Referring to 
Clinton's move to improve telecommunications links between Cuba and the US, Raul 
stated that, "we are not sitting with our arms crossed, we are ready and prepared to reply 
in this politico-ideological area, to confront it in every dimension." (Reuters News 
Service, l 8NOV95: 17 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 12). Then, following Raul's 
policy announcement, foreigners that had met with dissidents in Cuba were expelled from 
that country and the Cubans whom they had contacted were harassed. The Castro regime 
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also used a new tactic to inhibit contacts between dissidents and foreign visitors and 
relatives . Thi s new tactic is to banish dissidents to the provinces, and away from Havana. 
(Lopez, 1997: 242). 
Then, in 1994, food shortages in Cuba led to political unrest, which in tum 
resulted in large numbers of refugees attempting to emigrate to the US. In response , 
reversing previous favorable treatment policies regarding the entry of Cuban immigrants 
into the US, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) barred the entry of 
Cuban refugees fleeing the island by sea and began to intern them at Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base in southeastern Cuba. Eventually, the US government detained more than 
27,000 Cubans at Guantanamo and nearly 10,000 Cubans in Panama. Furthermore, in 
response to Cuba's refusal to limit the number ofrefugees fleeing Cuba , Clinton 
tightened controls on travel to Cuba and banned the disbursement of money from the US 
by Cuban -Americans to their relatives living in Cuba . (Washington Post , 9SEP94: A 17; 
10OCT94 : Al3 ; 8MAR95: Al8 as quoted in Hufbauer , et al: 1990: 12-13) . 
In September of 1994, Cuba and the US signed an immigration agreement to limit 
the number of refugees allowed to leave Cuba for the US. The US decided that it would 
not accept refugees who came to the US by sea, but agreed to grant at least 20,000 
immigrant visas at its diplomatic offices in Havana each year, up from an average of 
11,000 issued annually over the previous decade . (Financial Times, 26SEP95: 2) . 
The Cuban National assembly, in tum, passed a foreign investment law that 
allows foreign companies and individuals, including Cuban exiles, to own 100 percent in 
Cuban investments. This removed the previous restriction requiring that all foreign 
investments in Cuba be joint venture investments. All sectors, except for health, 
education, arid defense were opened up to foreign investment by this new policy. 
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However, foreign employers were still required to hire employees through the 
Cuban government and to pay employees in dollars through the government , which in 
tum pays the employees in pesos. (Economist, 9SEP95: 45). Usually, the salary paid by 
the foreign firm equals approximately $450 each month for each employee. And yet, the 
employee still only receives the equivalent of$ l O per month in Cuban pesos. As a result, 
by keeping the salaries paid by the foreign investors in American dollars, the Cuban 
government has been able to find still another source of hard currency to build up its 
reserves. (Economist, 9SEP95: 45). 
Introduction to the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 (also known as the Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act or the Libertad Act of 1996) 
In October of 1995, President Clinton eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for 
educational, religious, and human rights purposes. But the move was strongly criticized 
by anti-Castro members of Congress, who testified that travel agencies were scheduling 
"humanitarian " hunting trips to get around legal restrictions barring tourist travel to 
Cuba. As a result of such attempts to circumvent the legal restrictions placed on travel 
between the US and Cuba, these same members of Congress pledged to redouble their 
efforts to tighten sanctions on Cuba. (Ross-Lehtinen, House, 5MAR95: 5-7). In fact, 
Senator Jesse Helms stated in May of 1995 that the Helms-Burton Act would do just that. 
According to Helms, the Helms-Burton Act would tighten the sanctions against Cuba if 
the American Congress would pass it and President Clinton would sign it into law. Later, 
Helms also state that, "Fidel Castro is a tyrant. What keeps him in power is money (hard 
currency) from the outside. The LIBERT AD Act will choke off that Castro 
bonanza ... the life support system that has kept him in power all these years, and force 
him out of power." (United States Information Service [USIS] 22MA Y95). 
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However, the "tit for tat" restrictions, measures and attacks exchanged by the US 
and Cuban governments escalated on February 24, 1996 when a Cuban MiG-29 fighter 
plane shot down two American civilian aircraft in international airspace. The two planes 
that were shot down were owned by a Cuban-American exile group called "Brothers-to-
the-Rescue" and no one on board either of the two airplanes survived. In reaction , 
President Clinton condemned the action, suspended charter travel to and from Cuba, and 
pledged to reach a rapid agreement on the Helms-Burton Act. (New York Times 
27FEB96: Al; Washington Post, 27FEB96: A8 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 13). 
Then, in March of 1996, President Clinton and the American Congress held true 
to their words and the Senate passed a compromise version of the Helms-Burton or 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERT AD) by a vote of 74 to 22 . A 
similar measure had passed the House the previous September, but had stalled in the 
Senate because of opposition from the US State Department as well as major US allies 
(Canada, Mexico , United Kingdom, and Japan). (New York Times, 6MAR96: A7). But 
on March 6, 1996, the House of Representatives passed the revised legislation 336 to 86 
and President Clinton signed the bill into law on March 12. (Washington Post , 7MAR96: 
A30 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 14). 
The main reason behind the establishment and passing of the Helms-Burton Act 
was that it was supposed to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba. As Assistant 
Secretary of State, Alan Larson put it in 1999: 
"Our policy is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy and respect for 
human rights in Cuba in four ways: first, pressure on the government through 
economic sanctions and measures delineated in the 1996 Libertad Act ; Second , 
reaching out to and supporting Cuban people to encourage the development of a 
civil society; third, cooperation with the Cuban government on interests of direct 
concern, particularly to maintain migration in safe, orderly and legal channels; 
and forth, forging a multilateral alliance with the nations of the rest of the world 
to press for democratic change in Cuba, respect for human rights, and 
development of independent civil society." (United States Information Service 
[USIS], 11MAR99: 119). 
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A key mechanism by which the Helms-Burton Act is supposed to contribute to a 
transition to democracy is by tightening the economic sanctions and thereby reducing the 
hard currency left available to the Castro government. This reasoning was given by 
President Clinton when he signed the Helms-Burton bill into law as well as by 
congressional supporters of the Act. And the same justification has been repeated time 
and again by officials of the Clinton Administration throughout the years since the 
Helms-Burton Act was passed. (Lopez, 1997: 238). 
Details of the Helms-Burton Act 
The Helms-Burton Act has four titles. Title I codifies (makes into law) existing 
federal regulations and reaffirms the sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act as 
well as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. Importantly, Title I and II have provisions 
for presidential waivers, while Title IV does not. 
Title I seeks to strengthen international sanctions against Cuba and the Castro 
government the most. Among the various sections of Title I is the instruction to the 
heads of US financial institutions to oppose loans to Cuba and Cuban members until the 
country successfully transitioned to a democratic form of government. Title II states 
mainly that the US government must prepare a financial aid plan for a transitional Cuban 
government that is democratically elected in Cuba after Castro either dies or is removed 
from power. 
Next, Title III of the bill permits Americans with claims to property expropriated 
by the Cuban government between 1959 and 1961 to sue foreign companies or 
individuals that traffic in such property for damages in American courts. Trafficking is 
defined in the legislation as the buying, selling, leasing, marketing or otherwise 
benefiting from the use of expropriated American properties. President Clinton allowed 
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Title III to become law, but has the authority to waive its enforcement as a law for 
periods of six months. With this in mind, Clinton applied the national interest waiver and 
suspended the enforcement of Title III for six months on July 16, 1996. (Financial Times, 
17 JUL96: I). Since that time, Title III has never been enforced. (Lopez, 1997: 239). 
Under Title IV, the US must deny entry to the executives and major shareholders 
of foreign companies, as well as their immediate families that are found to be trafficking 
in expropriated property. The legislation also seeks to restrict US aid to independent 
states of the former Soviet Union if they provide assistance for intelligence collection 
facilities in Lourdes, Cuba. In addition, the Helms - Burton Act not only restricts aid to 
any country that helps with the completion of the Cuban-Juragua nuclear power plant, but 
also provides for presidential waivers for humanitarian aid or aid to promote market 
reforms and democratization in Cuba. Foreign companies subjected to the effects of Title 
IV can gain a reprieve by, "divesting from expropriated American properties." (Lopez , 
1997: 239). And so far, Title IV has only been applied to the two largest foreign 
investors in Cuba. These two investors include Mexico's telephone powerhouse, Grupo 
Domos and Sherritt International from Canada. (Lopez, 1997: 239). 
ORA WING INTERNATIONAL FIRE 
Since the 1996 passing of the Helms-Burton Act, Titles III and IV have drawn the 
most international attention and criticism, especially from Mexico, Canada and the 
European Union. These countries claim that the Helms-Burton Act, "violates trade 
accords and is an infringement on the sovereignty of other countries by its 
"extraterritorial" attempt to apply US laws to foreign-based companies." (Lopez, 1997 
239). In fact, Canadian Trade Minister Art Eggleton announced that Canada planned to 
seek consultations with the US under Chapter 12 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFT A) regarding the legality of the Helms-Burton Act as it is applied to 
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sovereign nations. Then, joined by Mexican officials, Canadian officials also say that 
they will try to include provisions in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
that would prevent the US from imposing its secondary sanctions on countries that trade 
with Cuba. (Inside US Trade, 1 OMA Y96: 20-21; l 5MA Y96: 8). 
Following the Canadian and Mexican objections, the Helms-Burton Act was 
condemned by members of the UN, the OAS, and other international organizations. The 
34 members of the OAS passed a resolution without the US that declared the Helms-
Burton Act illegal in that it, "does not conform to international law." (Financial Times, 
29AUG96: 4). Then, after the OAS vote, the Mexican Congress overwhelmingly passed 
a law that imposes fines of over $300,000 dollars on any Mexican companies that comply 
with the law. (New York Times, 2OCT96: A9 as quoted in Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 15). 
That action is followed by the European Union's Council of Ministers approval of anti-
sanction legislation that forbids compliance with the Helms-Burton Act. EU-based 
companies are prohibited from complying with the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act 
unless they receive a waiver based on the grounds that refusing to comply with the 
Helms-Burton Act will hurt either the company's or the EU's economic interests . 
In addition, the EU stated that US court awards awarded under the provisions of 
the Helms-Burton Act will not be recognized, and can be recovered by the EU if a 
successful American plaintiff has property within EU boundaries. (European Union 
News, 29OCT96). And finally, the Canadian Parliament followed up its previous protests 
with legislation that penalizes Canada-based companies for obeying the American "Act". 
The Canadian legislation also allows Canada's Attorney General to issue blocking orders 
of US court judgments, as well as allowing Canadians to recover penalties lost. 
(International Trade Reporter, 4DEC96: 1865). 
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Consequently, it should be easy to see that the American government has gotten 
into trouble with its main allies and trading partners because of the Helms-Burton Act. 
Further, it should also be easy to see how the US, "has risked undermining the authority 
of the World Trade Organization over the "Act" by maintaining that the law is conducive 
to encouraging a democratic transition in Cuba." (Lopez, 1997: 239). Moreover , the 
claims that the Helms-Burton Act helps to encourage Cuba to transition to a democratic 
form of government have been harshly criticized by academics, government officials 
from various governments as well as by Castro's own daughter. Criticisms that seem 
justified since, according to Jimmy Carter, "the Helms-Burton Act is an obstacle to a 
transition to democracy in Cuba," - a hindrance rather than a help. (Lopez, 1997: 239). 
FINDINGS 
The purpose of economic trade sanctions: The Cuban Case 
Following the historical background of economic sanctions in general and US 
economic sanctions against Cuba, this paper will next analyze how the US economic 
sanctions imposed against Cuba have affected the Cuban economy. This is relatively 
important to understand since authors like Losman have suggested that the political 
purposes of economic sanctions (their foreign policy goals) can not be attained without 
the sanctions first negatively impacting the economy of the target regime . Therefore, by 
finding out how much the US economic sanctions imposed against Cuba negatively 
affected the Cuban economy, we should be able to see that the economic damage was 
insufficient to translate into the desired regime changes, political policy alterations or an 
ideological reorientation. And finally, after looking at the economic impact of the US 
sanctions against Cuba, we will summarize the key points of this paper as well as state 
the conclusions that the author has drawn from the evidence presented herein. 
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The Cuba taken over by Fidel Castro was not incredibly poor if compared to Latin 
America in general. In fact , according to Donna Kaplowitz , Cuba had been among the 
top three Latin American countries categorized by living standards in 1950. (Kaplowitz , 
1998 : 27). However , the problem with Cuba was that its society had begun to stagnate. 
It had stopped its relative economic progression . In fact, Cuba's GNP was close to the 
same in 1950 that it had been in 1925. A situation caused in large part to the dramatic 
increase in the Cuba population without an accompanying increase in sugar production. 
As a result, the flat economy led to widespread frustration among the Cuban people as 
well as a desire for change. A desire for change that helped Fidel Castro come to power 
in Cuba as well as fueled his attempts to transform the Cuban economy. (Kaplowitz , 
1998: 27). 
Unfortunately for Castro, the stagnate Cuban economy not only helped him come 
into power in Cuba , but it also made Cuba highly vulnerable to US economic (trade) 
sanctions. Trade sanctions can be applied by the country imposing them to restrict the 
target nation's access to either import markets or export markets . Early on in the US-
Cuban economic conflict , policy makers like presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John 
F. Kennedy focused on the use of economic sanctions as a tool to give the US control 
over the economic and political processes of Cuba by denying that target nation access to 
key international trade markets. (Kaempfer, 1992: 65). 
Obviously , knowing the vulnerabilities of the Cuban economy in 1961, it would 
have seemed perfectly reasonable to assume that the American economic sanctions 
imposed against Cuban imports and exports would have worked. It was the level of 
American trade with Cuba that the US policy makers had the most control over and the 
loss of which should have severely impacted the Cuban economy. 
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Before the Castro-led revolution in Cuba in 1959, between 20 and 25 percent of 
all Cuban land was owned by American sugar companies, half the arable land was used 
for sugar crops, and the Cuban sugar industry employed more than 50,000 Cubans. 
(Doxey, 1980: 38). Also, at that time, Cuba had an established road and railway system, 
and domestic mineral resources like nickel, tin, and iron ore, but no domestic supply of 
petroleum. Consequently, Cuban dependence on imported oil as well as on exported 
sugar made Cuba potentially vulnerable to the negative effects of American economic 
sanctions. (Doxey, 1980: 38). 
Moreover, with sugar as the main export crop of Cuban domestic industry , the 
Cuban economy lived and died by the fluctuations of the global sugar market. Thus, 
following the embargo of Cuban sugar exports by the US in 1960, Cuba was forced to 
both reevaluate, and dramatically change its foreign trade policy. Without the 
exportation of sugar to the US, imports , "which accounted for approximately 35 percent 
of Cuba 's gross national product (GNP) in 1959, could not be financed ." (Doxey, 1980: 
38). 
As a result, the Cuban government instituted import controls and the importation 
of consumer goods declined by more than 44 percent in value between 1959 and 1962. 
(Doxey, 1980: 38). This decline in imports was bad news not only for Cuban industrial 
development, but also for the re-supply of intermediate parts and goods necessary for the 
repair and maintenance of a Cuban industrial infrastructure that was largely of US origin. 
The factories could not be repaired without the American parts and could not run without 
American refined oil. In other words, even though Cuban trade with the rest of Latin 
America declined following the imposition of US/OAS-backed economic sanctions, it 
was the loss of the trade with the US that had the greatest potential to damage the Cuban 
economy. 
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However, according to Donna Kaplowitz, the central economic factor that made 
Cuba potentially vulnerable to the negative effects of US sanctions was neither Cuba's 
dependence on the production and exportation of sugar, nor the monopoly of 75 percent 
of all Cuban land by the Sugar companies. Additionally, the lack of diversification of the 
domestic industrial complex was also not a great threat. On the contrary, the key 
vulnerability that had the greatest potential to cause economic harm to Cuba was the 
overwhelming domination of the Cuban economy and Cuban trade by the US. 
(Kaplowitz, 1998:29). 
In fact, during the decade prior to Castro's take over of Cuba, almost two-thirds of 
all Cuban trade was with the U.S. This should have been very troubling to Castro and his 
newly appointed leadership since the chances for the success of economic sanctions 
increase proportionately with the level of total trade done between the target country and 
the nation imposing the sanctions. (Kaplowitz, 1998: 30). In fact, according to Cole 
Blasier and Carmelo Mesa Lago, Cuba imported between 60 and 65 percent of its total 
imports from the US . And, by 1959, the US bought more than 69 percent of Cuba's 
exports. (Blasier & Mesa-Lago , 1979: 184). "Moreover, in that same year, US interests 
in Cuba produced more than 40 percent of Cuba's total raw sugar crop ... controlled over 
90 percent of Cuban public utilities .... 50 percent of Cuba's railways ... and held more 
than 25 percent of Cuba's bank deposits." (Kaplowitz, 1998: 30). 
Consequently, at the time the embargo was originally imposed against Cuba, the 
US accounted for a significant level of Cuba's international trade. A level considered to 
be significant since Cuba imported between 60 and 65 percent of its imports from the US, 
while America bought more than 69 percent of Cuba's total exports (Blasier & Mesa-
Lago, 1979: 184 ). And this was especially difficult for both the Cuban economy and the 
Cuban dictator as he tried to institute economic reforms friendly to his newly found 
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socialist ideological beliefs. For, as illustrated by Graph# 2 (See Appendix 2, Graphs), 
international trade in general brought in more than $1500 million pesos each year to the 
Cuban economy . 
However, the weakness of unilateral economic sanctions (like the US embargo 
imposed against Cuba) is that they fail to take into account the complexities of trade in 
the international economic arena . On both the import and export sides of the target 
nation's trade , there are likely to be substitutes available to replace the trade inhibited by 
the sender ' s sanctions. This is true since, for virtually all traded goods, there are several 
countries that can produce a certain good and can serve as an alternate trading partner for 
the target nation . "Furthermore , the laws of comparative advantage suggest that even if 
an alternative supply source is currently not available to the target nation among its 
remaining trading partners , at least one of these partners is likely to be able to begin the 
production and exportation of the good in question, if at a slightly higher cost to the 
target." (Kaempfer , 1992: 65). 
The availability of alternate supply sources is evident in the Graph entitled Cuba 's total 
import s by country of orig in presented below. Albeit , the Graph covers a four-year period of 
trade that took place almost 36 years after the sanctions were originally imposed against Cuba, 
but that is not important. What is important, is the fact that the Graph shows an increase in 
Cuba's level of imports from a variety of countries of origin (including the United Kingdom , 
Romania , Singapore, Belgium/Luxembourg and Japan) . In addition, the Graph also shows an 
increase in the millions ($US) of dollars of trade being carried out by Cuba while under the 
effects of an American trade embargo. In other words, even though the period of time covered in 
the Graph took place long after the US sanctions were imposed against Cuba, it more importantly 
illustrates the increased ability of Cuba to import the goods that it needs from abroad in spite of 
the American embargo. 
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percent of Cuban exports , by 1962 Cuban trade with the US was negligible . This level of 
trade was not only replaced by the countries of the former Soviet Union , but it was also 
surpassed as the Communist countries came to account for almost 82 percent of Cuba 's 
export trade and 85 percent of Cuba's import trade. (Doxey, 1980:39). 
In addition , as we can also see from Graph # 4 (see Appendix 2), the main trading 
partners from the Communist countries included : the USSR , China, Czechoslovakia , 
Bulgaria , Romania , Yugoslavia and other smaller communist nations . To stimulate this 
increasing trade relationship, the Soviet Union signed an agreement early in 1960 to buy 
2. 7 million tons of sugar initially and to increase purchases after the US placed a total ban 
on the importation of Cuban sugar to the US. (Doxey, 1980: 39). As a result , relations 
between the Soviet Union and Cuba became very close and a long-term trade agreement 
signed in 1963 increased the amount of Soviet sugar imports from Cuba by a million tons 
each year to a maximum of 5 million tons imported from Cuba in 1968. (Doxey , 1980: 
39). 
As a typical developing nation , Cuba has always been highly dependent on 
foreign trade . This dependence , though , was increasin gly evident in Cuba since so much 
of Cuba ' s land was devoted to the planting and growing of an inexpensive export crop 
like sugar. And , unfortunately, Cuba still has to import much of the food, oil, and 
intermediate industrial products that it needs. (Kaplowitz , 1998: 31). 
Next , between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s , annual imports equaled between 
22 percent and 32 percent of the Cuban GNP (as illustrated by Graph# 5), while exports 
accounted for 8 to 12 percent. "In 1958, for example , more than 57 percent of Cuba's 
GNP went to foreign trade. In comparison, in other small Latin American countries, 
imports made up approximately only 25 percent." (Kaplowitz, 1998: 31). Furthermore, 
to place Cuban trade into a better perspective, US imports and exports account for less 
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than 10 percent of America's GNP. (Kaplowitz, 1998: 31 ). Highly dependent on foreign 
trade , the level of importance of foreign trade to the Cuban economy ( as also shown by 
graph # 5) shows further just how vulnerable Cuba should have been to the negative 
influences of US economic sanctions . 
And yet, as Graphs # l - 5 show, high dependence does not guarantee the success 
of economic sanctions. According to Peter Wallensteen, target nations had an average 
level of 32 percent dependence in cases where economic sanctions were successful, 
whereas ineffective sanctions were applied against countries with 27 percent dependence. 
(Wallensteen, 1983: 104 ). However, some highly dependent states like Cuba , 
successfully withstood the pressure of US imposed economic sanctions. 
As a result, we need to take the analysis a step further and look at the actual 
reduction of trade caused by the application of economic sanctions. "Calculating this 
reduction during the first year of sanctions (which in some cases is the only year of 
sanctions) we find an average reduction of approximately 13 percent." (Wallensteen , 
1983 : 105). 
The picture illustrated by Wallensteen's following table is quite clear - economic 
sanctions have not achieved a complete reduction of trade in any single case. 
Consequently , it would be foolish to believe that sanctions could completely reduce trade 
since few states are so dependent on certain trading partners that they can not find 
alternate suppliers to meet their trading needs. Even Cuba , a country that was overly 
dependent on the US for trade, was able to find alternative trading partners shortly after 
the economic sanctions were put in place against it. 
The first explanation for Cuba ' s ability to find alternative-trading partners is that 
the US was unable to cut off all trade. In the case of Cuba, this happened because all 
transactions between Cuba and the Soviet Union could not be stopped without resorting 
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to the use of a military blockade of the island. The second and more important 
explanation is not based on the inability of the US to halt Cuba ' s international trading. 
Rather, the second reason is that Cuba had been able to find new trading partners willing 
to both support and trade with it either as an available market or as an ideological brother. 
In the Cuban case , Cuban exports to the US were almost entirely replaced by sales 
to the Soviet Union. However, this can be seen , as a particularly peculiar fact when we 
realize that one of the reasons for American sanctions imposed against Cuba was the 
already increasing trade with the Soviet Union . At the time , US policy makers claimed 
that an increase in the level of Soviet-Cuban trade might result in lost sales for American 
companies to Cuba . However, unfortunately for the American policy makers , what 
happened after the imposition of sanctions was a dramatic intensification of an already 
intense situation. (Wallensteen, 1983: 106). 
Actual Reduction of Target Nations' Total Trade 
Reduction of total trade at end of first year of sanctions, calculated as percentage of total 
trade the year before sanctions were imposed 
Receiver Total Reduction in Percent 





Dominican Republic 21 




Source: Wallensteen, 1983: 105 
Following Cuba's increased trade with the former Soviet Union and the collapse 
of trade with the US, a government like Castro's should have been politically vulnerable 
to the negative effects of the economic sanctions. Granted, it could be said that the full 
effects of sanctions are not usually felt during the first year. And further stated that, if 
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only the sanctions were applied for a long time, the impact would be greater. The 
information presented in the previous table would suggest just the opposite. In fact, 
Wallensteen's table suggests that, the longer economic sanctions were imposed against 
Cuba, the weaker their economic impact. And the weaker the economic impact, the less 
likely that the negative economic effects of the sanctions will translate directly into 
desired political changes made by the target regime. 
Conclusion 
From this brief look into the condition of the Cuban economy both prior to and 
during the US imposed economic sanctions, it is evident that Cuba should have been 
vulnerable to the negative effects of the American sanctions . For, as we saw earlier, the 
US provided more than 60 percent of Cuba's imports prior to the sanctions, thereby 
controlling the supply of many important raw materials as well as intermediate goods 
necessary for the maintenance of Cuba's industrial sector. Meanwhile, during that same 
period , the US imported more than 68 percent of Cuba's exports, making Cuba dependent 
on the American purchase of Cuban-produced goods. Additionally , we also saw that the 
US purchased more than half of Cuba's main product: sugar. 
The "overwhelming" domination of Cuban trade by the US discussed earlier was 
increased significantly by Congressionally set import quotas used to increase Cuba's 
dependence on the US as its main trading partner. And yet, time and again, Cuba has 
been able to overcome the negative effects of the American sanctions as well as maintain 
its ability to defy the cries of US policy makers. The same policy makers that we see 
periodically on the news demanding the ouster of Fidel Castro from his seat of power in 
Cuba, the democratization of the Cuban political system, and the improvement of Cuba's 
human rights record. 
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The American policy makers and political leadership from Eisenhower to Clinton 
may very well have been disappointed by the fact that Castro has been able to withstand 
the negative effects of the US sanctions imposed against Cuba. Furthermore, in spite of 
the continuous efforts of politicians like Representative Dan Burton and Senator Jesse 
Helms , Castro has been able to prevent the US from reclaiming Cuba as its economic and 
political "protectorate". Moreover , Castro 's very survival in the face of such staunch 
political opposition and lengthy economic sanctions , gives him a level of gravitates on 
the world stage as an actor who has stood up to the class bully (the world's only 
remaining superpower) and refused to give in to its demands (Schwab, 1998: 169). 
As Margaret Doxey has stated," sanctions have regularly been used as a 
supplement to the use of force in war and have also been used to influence the foreign 
and domestic policies of target states," (Doxey, 1980: 3), in the place of military 
aggression. But it is only since the increased economic interdependence in the global 
marketplace that economic sanctions have become a foreign policy tool to be used alone, 
separated from the use of military force. Realizing the fact that sanctions were preferable 
to the use of force since they do not involve a risk to the lives of the citizens of the 
country imposing the sanctions ( especially after the bungled Bay of Pigs invasion), US 
policy makers felt that the application of economic sanctions against Cuba was their best 
option. And yet, since global economic interdependence undermines unilaterally 
imposed sanctions, this development seems rather odd. 
However, as many contemporary experts agree, American economic sanctions 
have been ineffective at attaining their stated foreign policy goals. According to 
sanctions scholar, James Blessing , "it can be argued that . . . neither the suspension of aid 
nor the use of economic sanctions have been effective mechanisms of inducing behavior 
change," in the target nations. (Blessing, 1981: 533). Perhaps, they have been 
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ineffective because the policy makers imposing them have failed to follow the advice of 
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott when they stated that, "If it (sanctions) were done, when 'tis 
done , then 'twere well it were done quickly." (Hufbauer, et al, 1990: 6). 
This statement concisely presents the main problem with the case of the American 
economic sanctions imposed against Cuba. That the heavy and slow hand of the close to 
four decades old sanctions have invited both the evasion of Cuba's international trading 
partners and the mobilization of domestic and international Third World opinion in 
support of Castro . For, as we have already learned , Castro ' s Cuban government has been 
able to find both alternate suppliers for the goods that it needs as well as alternate buyers 
of the goods that it produces domestically almost since day one of the American 
embargo. Meanwhile, the slow and drawn out imposition of the American sanctions 
against Cuba has allowed Castro to strengthen his domestic and international support 
base as he marshals the citizens of Cuba as well as the leaders of the world to his side. 
(Hufbauer , et al, 1990: 6). 
Castro , has become a political role model for sultanistic/ authoritarian dictators 
around the world as well as for Cuban citizens at home. He has become a role model of 
such international stature that the US has been unable to either understand or stop. To the 
American political leadership, Castro is an puzzle, but to the other nations targeted by US 
economic sanctions (Iraq, Iran, Libya) and their citizens whom resent, " America's post-
cold war imperialism and intrusive policies, he stands alone as a beacon , though in many 
ways an overshadowed one." (Schwab, 1998: 169). 
In any event, the inverse relationship between the effectiveness and the duration 
of the economic sanctions argues against a strategy of slowly applying more and more 
economic restrictions through the application of economic sanctions over time until the 
target caves in. Time afforded Cuba the opportunity to find alternative suppliers and 
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buyers , to build new economic relationships with the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, and to mobilize domestic support for its policies . For, sanctions that are long and 
drawn out like the American sanctions imposed against Cuba allow the target nation to 
overcome the "key vulnerabilities" that made it an attractive target in the first place. 
(Hufbauer et al, 1990: 1). Therefore , based on the previous information, it should be easy 
to see why the American sanction imposed against Cuba are ineffective and no longer 
stand a chance of successfully attaining their stated foreign policy goals. 
Initially , Cuba was able to overcome its lack of diversification of domestic 
production by retooling its industrial complex with non-US intermediate parts. This 
action removed the Cuban reliance on the US for those parts while simultaneously 
allowing it to begin to produce a variety of new products (like the production of 
refrigerators shown in Graph# 6). Secondly , Cuba was able to replace the 
loss of trade with the US immediately following the application of sanctions against it. 
Furthermore, with the level of trade with the US making up more than 60 percent of 
Cuba's total imports and more than 68 percent of its total exports, it speaks well of 
Castro's Cuban government that Cuba was able to make up for the lost trade so soon after 
the sanctions were imposed . This ability of Cuba to find alternate trade partners is also 
significant since foreign trade made up more than 40 percent of Cuba's total GNP . 
And finally , the ability of Cuba to increase its annual economic growth rates 
following the application of the American sanctions suggests further that the sanctions 
failed to effectively harm the Cuban economy (see Graphs# 7 & 8). For , if the sanctions 
had effectively influenced the Cuban economy, the economic harm incurred, would have, 
"translated through the target state ' s (Cuba's) political system and into either policy 
changes, regime changes," or ideological alterations. (Losman, 1979: 41 ). And, since 
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GRAPH 1: Foreign Trade of Cuba, 1957-1975 
Source: (I) Mesa-Lago , C. (1979) . The economy and international economic relations . In Blasier , C. & Mesa-
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Sources: (I) US Central Intelligence Agency, (1998) . The World Fact Book . 
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GRAPH 3: EXPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN IN MILLIONS $US 
Sources: (1) US Central Intelligence Agency. (1998). The World Fact Book 
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GRAPH 5: IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN TRADE TO THE CUBAN ECONOMY, 1957-1974 
Source: (I) Mesa-Lago, C. (1979). The economy and international economic relations . In Blasier, C. & Mesa-
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GRAPH 6: PHYSICAL OUTPUT OF SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT, 1957-1975 
Source: (1) Mesa-Lago, C. (1979) . The economy and international economic relations. In Blasier, C. & Mesa-
Lago, C. (Eds.), Cuba in the World. Pitts bur h: University of Pittsburgh Press. P . 177 
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GRAPH 7: GNP ANNUAL GROWTH RATES AS A(%) IN CUBA, 1975-1997 
Source: (I) <http: //www.eclac.cl /English/Publications /survey98 /table2.gif-> 
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GRAPH 8: GNP ANNUAL GROWTH RATES AS A(%) IN CUBA, 1959-1975 
Source: (l) Mesa-Lago , C. (l 979) . The economy and international economic relation s. In Blasier , C. & Mesa-
Lago , C. (Eds .), Cuba in the World . Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press . Pp . 170. 
